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LOYALISM AND PATRIOTISM AT ASKANCE:  
COMMUNITY, CONSPIRACY, AND CONFLICT  
ON THE SOUTHERN FRONTIER

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“[The king] has excited domestic insurrections amongst us, and has endeavored to bring on the inhabitants of our frontiers, the merciless Indian savages. . .”

---Thomas Jefferson, *Declaration of Independence*

“For most historians of the period, rhetoric outweighed research and their side was invariably good and godly while the other side was wicked and perfidious.”

---George Fenwick Jones<sup>1</sup>

“The losers in a conflict are faced with whether to cut their losses or to gamble at continuing the conflict hoping that they will somehow ‘snatch victory from the jaws of defeat.’”

---Daniel Kahneman<sup>2</sup>

On the morning of February 14, 1779, some 600 of the king’s loyal Americans, popularly known as Loyalists or Tories, camped along cane-choked, swampy, flooded Kettle Creek in Wilkes County on the then northwest frontier of Georgia. Their local guides prepared to lead them to sympathizers in the Wrightsborough Quaker settlement and, from there, to the protection of regular British troops who had occupied nearby Augusta during the previous two weeks. The Redcoats that these Americans sought had themselves come to Georgia from New York on a mission to rendezvous with thousands of frontier Carolinians. British leaders in London imagined that this army’s arrival would begin a counterrevolution wherein these Americans would restore to the Crown all of the colonies south from Maryland and perhaps beyond. Southern Loyalist leaders even argued that confiscation of rebel property for sale would pay for the campaign. Advocates of this grand scheme, now called the “Southern Strategy,” wanted to believe it would change history.<sup>3</sup>

What ensued at Kettle Creek that morning would come to loom large in the folklore of the South as one of the few Patriot victories in Georgia, a state otherwise seldom remembered as having any Revolutionary War heritage.<sup>4</sup> This battle resulted in little loss of life for either side:

twenty dead identified as Loyalists and at least four of the attacking militiamen killed and three men mortally wounded. It failed to affect the outcome of the invasion of Georgia in 1778-1779 and even helped to relegate the overall campaign to obscurity. The battle itself, conversely, would achieve notoriety in American and British histories of the Revolution from the 1780s to the present as an incidental event outside of the mainstream of the war and of uncertain importance. It in no way affected the outcome of the war.<sup>5</sup>

What happened, and to a degree, what failed to happen, that morning in the Hammett family's typical frontier pasture had special significance on many levels. Like the battles of Moore's Creek Bridge, Ramseur's Mill, and Kings Mountain, it well represents the forgotten ethnic civil wars that played major roles in the history of that era in America and the failure of counter-revolution strategies from before that time to the present. It demonstrates that the American Revolution does not belong in some unique and morally pure category but as one of the first modern revolutions and civil wars that shares more in common with later conflicts in France, Russia, Mexico, Cuba, Vietnam, and elsewhere than many Americans could or will accept. It shows, for example, how military actions can result more from and better represent major social and political currents than the strategies of war. Even as early as 1780, an anonymous writer noted of such events:

Most of these actions would in other wars be considered as skirmishes of little account, and scarcely worthy of a detailed narrative. But these small actions are as capable as any of displaying conduct. The operations of war being spread over the vast continent . . . it is by such skirmishes that the fate of America must be decided. They are therefore as important as battles in which a hundred thousand men are drawn up on each side.<sup>6</sup>

At Kettle Creek, the British Southern Strategy failed as it would fail repeatedly to the end of the war, in part, because in such specific clashes of arms it revealed itself as an historical but misguided use of military force in an attempt to force an undetermined solution to such social issues as economic ambitions, politics, class, religion, and race. Loyalists in this particular fight

demonstrated that what largely remained of the “king’s men” consisted of desperate and cowered members of what historian Linda Colley described, for all of America, as a coalition of poly-ethnic minorities who sought protection more than the opportunity to die for an already failed cause. The “thousands” of Loyalists actually turned out to be hundreds of men who mainly disappeared into the canebrakes and woods in the face of violent opposition from their neighbors. The conflict in America had become a foreign occupation that became a prime example of Chinese philosopher Sun Tzo’s adage that a successful army understands the definition of victory and strives for it while a military destined for defeat fights first while hoping to find the conditions for victory. Had how the battle of Kettle Creek in 1779 represented such failure, as it does even when compared to modern conflicts, the events of 1775-1776 could have been seen in ways that would have avoided the fighting in the South in 1780-1781 and thus saved thousands of lives.<sup>7</sup>

The issues that turned into armed conflict as part of an American civil war that morning on Kettle Creek represent much more, including a sometimes violent social struggle on the southern frontier that began before and which would continue after the American Revolution that British Colonel Robert Gray rightly noted consisted of a patchwork of settlements each fighting for its own respective cause. A long standing general political struggle between the coastal planter oriented individual colonial governments and the families who settled in the backcountry masked this clash of cultures of different groups on the frontier. In the months before the war officially broke out, for example, thousands of southern frontiersmen appeared to have actively and very publicly come forward in support of the king’s cause. In 1774, hundreds of the backcountry Georgians, including such later Whig (rebel) leaders at Kettle Creek as John Dooly and Elijah Clarke, signed petitions in support of royal rule. They

specifically opposed the actions of the coastal oriented rebels as threatening the British protection of their families on the frontier from Indian attack. Royal Governor Josiah Martin of North Carolina arranged a similar petition drive in his colony. In South Carolina, thousands of frontiersmen who opposed the Revolution refused, en mass, to sign the rebels' Continental Association. Throughout the Carolinas, overall, at least some 2,500 Loyalists took up arms and marched against the Revolution in 1775-1776. Leaders in London would base their hopes upon these men and their neighbors starting a civil war that would restore the colonies to the Crown.<sup>8</sup>

The true number of frontiersmen in opposition to the rebellion in its early years in the South, however, proved deceptive because it represented more of the people of the backcountry coming together to continue to express common concerns rather than out of loyalty to the colonial system. Most of these people could and would be won to any political cause that accelerated their own ongoing struggle for greater self determination. A restoration of the situation to what it had been in years past held little interest to these people. Critics attacked the Georgia petitions from St. Paul Parish as misleading about support for the king's cause. Consequently, the Loyalists in the Carolina backcountry who rose up for the king in the early years of the war suffered defeat at the hands of greater numbers of their neighbors at the battle of Moore's Creek Bridge in North Carolina and in the Snow Campaign of South Carolina. Scotsman Baika Harvey, a new arrival to the Kettle Creek-Wrightsborough area, watched the demise of the efforts of the king's men:

the Americans are Smart Industrious hardy people & fears Nothing . . . I am Just Returned from the Back parts where I seed Eight Thousand men in arms all with Riffled Barrill guns which they can hit the Bigness of a Dollar between Two & Three hundreds yards Distance the Little Boys not Bigger than my self has all their Guns & marches with their Fathers & all their Cry is Liberty or Death Dear Godfather tell all my Country people not to come here for the Americans will kill them Like Dear in the Woods & they will never see them they can lie on their Backs & Load & fire & every time they draws sight at anything they are sure to kill or Creple & they Run in the Woods like

Horses I seed the Liberty Boys take Between Two & Three hundred Torreys  
& one Liberty man would take & Drive four or five before him Just as  
shepards do the sheep in our Cuntry & they have taken all their arms from  
them and put the head men in gaile<sup>9</sup>

Leaders of the Loyalists, such as Englishman and Georgia planter Thomas Brown, went into exile from where they would advocate an invasion of the South by British troops that resulted in the uprising that would end at Kettle Creek. Overall, historian William H. Nelson argues that after 1776 only two populations of the king's supporters of any significance remained: one along the frontier from Georgia to New York and the other in the mid-Atlantic ports that had been largely cut out of the trans-Atlantic trade by such cities as Boston, Charleston, New York, and Philadelphia. He added that these Americans lived in areas that suffered most from a proximity to the far wealthier neighboring areas' economic interests and relatively little from any British policies. These two groups were also only marginally influenced by the trans-Atlantic trade, a motivation for other Americans to support the Revolution. Scholars of the Revolution now know that the Ministry sought to win a war that needed popular support from a population where the Loyalists were outnumbered by three to one. An estimated 100,000 Americans actively served in the Whig war effort. The 30,000 of their neighbors who took up arms for the king's cause, had they been treated as a serious military force by the royal army, might have just balanced that opposition when added to the numbers in the king's regular army, Indian allies, self-emancipated slaves, and German auxiliaries. Critics note, however, that this number of armed Loyalists only comes to one third of the number of them who, at the end of the war, moved to British possessions rather than remain in the new country. Among Americans opposed to living in the new United States; two thirds of their number were willing to risk an uncertain future in unknown lands but would not fight for the

king's cause. They would, however, guarantee that colonial America survived on in Africa, Canada, the Caribbean, and even in the South Pacific in the decades that followed.<sup>10</sup>

British leaders had reasons for failing to accept the true situation in America that originated in a clearer appreciation of how they stood to lose the war. By 1778, they realized that their strategy of intimidation had failed. The men of Washington's army could now match their foes in battle prowess although victories still largely eluded them. Great Britain lacked the military and financial resources to continue the war as it had been fought but especially with France now as an ally of the American rebels and as other European nations threatened to further take advantage of the situation. The fixed battles that the Redcoats still won came at the cost of encouraging more political, guerrilla, and social resistance as a populist backlash against the use of formal military force at home and abroad against people of English descent. British General Charles O'Hara observed during the American Revolution:

how impossible must it prove to conquer a Country, where repeated success cannot ensure permanent advantages, and the most trifling check to our Arms acts like an Electric Fire, by rousing at the same moment every Man upon the vast Continent to persevere upon the most distant dawn of hope.<sup>11</sup>

What followed remains controversial. Some critics, at the time and later, have argued that British attempts at Americanizing the war unintentionally inflamed already existing societal hostilities into bloody civil war and held up for years any peaceful reconciliation. Other scholars have argued that the pressures on the frontier, as demonstrated by the Carolina Regulator rebellions and similar strife, would have eventually turned to widespread violence anyway as westward expansion increased, that the American Revolution came only as an almost incidental event in a much larger struggle for the continent and particularly for the Indian frontier. This debate would be repeated in almost every counter insurgency war that followed with no clear answers.

From the earliest days of the fighting, the British strategists had tried to implement a rather nebulous plan for incorporating American support to somehow achieve victory. They called for the seizing the ports to use as bases from which the military could control the coasts. The army could then establish fortified outposts in the interior from which to recruit and draft the people into provincial and militia units, something very close to the strategy used later by the occupying forces in Vietnam and Iraq. Lord George Germain, 1st Viscount Sackville and the Secretary of State for the America, served as the chief administrator for the British war effort. He grew desperate enough to try such a plan and William Knox, his under secretary and a powerful influence upon him, prepared the details for such a campaign. A Protestant Irishman, Knox had been the provost in Georgia and had spent years in that colony building large and highly profitable plantations that he still owned. Later he moved to London where he served as Benjamin Franklin's assistant when Franklin served as colonial agent for that colony and still later in many influential positions within the British bureaucracy of state. Throughout the war Knox diligently served as one of those bureaucrats described by historian Robert Calhoon:

These men had worked for years to master the intricacies of imperial administration and formulate new and tough colonial policies. . . The result of all of these developments was a new colonial policy—on which several high ranking ministers staked their careers—prepared by a shadowy group of sub ministerial advisors and directed by harassed nervous men possessing neither the time nor the temperament to listen to colonial opinion or to reflect upon the long range impact of British policy on the health of the empire.<sup>12</sup>

Knox specifically and very publicly promoted a number of reconciliation schemes that included forming an American aristocracy with its own representation in Parliament. With the passage of the Declaration of Independence, he still saw an opportunity to replace the old



colonialism with a new Anglo relationship that proved visionary in that it represented a connection very similar to what would successfully exist between the two nations decades in the future. Historians have credited the Southern Strategy as the invention of various southern Loyalists but a plan by this under secretary, in his own handwriting, for the invasion of Georgia matches that actual campaign as it unfolded in almost every detail.<sup>13</sup>

William Knox chose that state as the target for reasons beyond his own self interest although a number of British merchants had petitioned for an invasion of Georgia as a means of recovering the debts owed to them.<sup>14</sup> It had a small and politically divided population with an inept state government that had fractured into partisanship of greater menace to itself than to the king. Geographically it stood as a bridge between the thousands of Loyalists believed to still be found on the Carolina frontier, the still larger numbers of Indian warriors supported by the king's agents, and the loyal populations of East Florida, West Florida, and Louisiana. A similar accident of location had led to the creation of Georgia in 1733 as a military buffer between British South Carolina and then neighboring provinces of France and Spain. This unique colony left a legacy as the starting point for many movements that had significant impact elsewhere. It began as a government financed experiment of a non profit Board of Trustees to solve social problems of England's middle class Protestant majority and as an experiment in the production of exotic products from what had been mistakenly believed would be a Mediterranean environment. Ironically, its conflict with Spain, known as the War of Jenkins's Ear (1738-1742) had inspired the creation of the American Regiment in New England and the Middle Colonies that had included Lawrence Washington, George's older brother, as an officer. The use of the word "American" in that context had been the first official demarcation of the people of the colonies as separate from the British as a whole. George Whitefield, John Wesley, and Benjamin Ingham would begin their careers in forming the Great Awakening from their

experiences in Georgia, which also became a frontier for the Separatist Baptists. Although the colony did establish the Church of England in 1758, it did so only in the face stiff of resistance from its greater numbers of Congregationalists, Lutherans, Presbyterians, and others. From these beginnings through the American Revolution, Circumstances often continued to encourage created societal experiments in Georgia that served as alternatives to the later Enlightenment of the type that Knox sometimes argued for in his writings. Beyond place and past, the thirteenth colony's some 18,000 white and 15,000 black inhabitants in 1774 had the same community oriented and often Loyalist society as South Carolina. Georgia failed to send a delegation for the whole colony to the First Continental Congress and it had the highest percentage of Loyalists in its population of the thirteen colonies in rebellion.<sup>15</sup>

British planners like Knox, however, misunderstood this cultural and historical reality of Georgia and consequently would begin there historical currents that would have a very different outcome from what they had intended. Historian Andrew C. Lannen has documented that, from its beginnings, individuals and very different communities in this colony had fought an almost continuous struggle for local authority and against rule imposed from abroad. This conflict mirrored the ambitious of Americans in the later Revolution. The dissention within the new state government represented a continuation of the struggle for local authority rather than any desire for a return to authoritarian rule. After the British did conquer the state and reduced it to colonial status with a restored provincial assembly, one of that body's last acts before its dissolution would be to establish on paper local government in the colony's farthest backcountry.<sup>16</sup>

Germain and Knox saw that the war would be decided by such Americans but mistakenly believed to the point of obsession that at least half of the colonial population still supported the

king's cause. In 1777, His Majesty's troops tried to rally the population's support in frontier Pennsylvania, New York, and Vermont. The subsequent defeat of British regulars at Saratoga by the professional American army, however, obscured the significance of the serious defeats that the Loyalists suffered at the hands of their neighbors in that campaign.<sup>17</sup> Despite, these setbacks, the British government would continue this figment of their desperation in the South with invasions of Georgia in 1778, South Carolina in 1780, and North Carolina in 1781. These attempts to mobilize the backcountry people to the king's cause that started with the Kettle Creek campaign continued almost to the end of the war. Lord Cornwallis made his invasion of Virginia, en route to his disastrous defeat at Yorktown, while still pursuing a hope of finding what still proved to be illusionary legions of Americans in an effort to repeat Burgoyne's failed strategy of 1777 but with an under strength and shattered army. Historian Richard Holmes has compared this strategy of the king's ministers to the attempt, two centuries later of the United States to "Vietnamize" its war in Southeast Asia. In both instances, and as with the American support for the White Russians in the Russian Revolution, soldiers who had devolved into being seen as invaders tried to build a popular consensus around groups outside of and in opposition to the local mainstream with the effect of further alienating the general population to the benefit of the rebellion. The king's soldiers became foreign peacekeepers in an alien land without peace as they tried to indigenize the war. They even became a part of a hopelessly flawed effort at restoring colonial government in Georgia; today that would be called "nation building." Ultimately, they only further succeeded in uniting Americans of many groups of different interests in ways that the rebel leaders had failed to do on their own. As Rudyard Kipling would famously warn Americans more than a century later in his poem *The White Man's Burden*, they found themselves damned for what they did wrong and ignored for what

good that they did. What remained of the king's "good Americans" came to appear as collaborators with an invading foreign army.<sup>18</sup>

Unfortunately, for the thousands of men, women, and children who suffered in the last years of the war, such a conflict usually ends only when the invading nation finally depletes its resources and is forced to abandon its adventure. Leaders who could ended it repeatedly proclaim that the war has turned one metaphorical corner after another while ignoring how many times they have returned to the same place. "Staying the course" for "100 years" or as "long as necessary" to achieve "peace with honor" exists more in desperate bravado, and as ideas for modern novels like *1984*, than in reality but national security and popular prejudices can provide an excuse to continue it after the chances for victory have fall to non-existent. Holmes has pointed out that the British press went so far as to adopt the tactic of warning the public that, if America won independence, Ireland would do the same at a time when it had more of the status of an occupied and exploited foreign land than did any other possessions. Such alarmist rhetoric resembles the modern "domino effect" hysteria associated with concerns about Leftist and Muslim fundamentalist governments. In a situation repeated in later conflicts, the British home government thus used the support of minorities to sustain its political and military ambitions abroad while the press used the fear of a minority in the home country to try to maintain popular support for the war. American supporters of the Revolution, but especially such veterans of the French and Indian War as George Washington, also questioned the necessary alliance with Roman Catholic France.

In the American Revolution, the majority of Britons and Americans viewed religious freedom a threat when it applied to any easing of civil restrictions on members of the Holy Roman Church in Ireland or elsewhere in the empire. A 1778 act that innocently intended to

drum up badly needed support for the American war by granting some political recognition for Catholics brought about the famous Gordon Riot in London in 1780, the worst public violence in the city's history. This massive civil disobedience undermined the concurrent British victories in South Carolina so as to compel the ministry to tie down troops in the south of England to assure the public that the country had protection from invasion by Catholic France. Those regiments might have otherwise been sent to America to follow up on the military successes. Thomas Jefferson, the author of the secular Declaration of Independence, also proposed an act to establish religious freedom in Virginia; thus he hardly belied popular British fears of its Protestant faith under siege by Papists and their allies in the form of humanists calling for total religious freedom. The situation became particularly partisan when Catholic France and Spain openly joined the war against Great Britain after the defeat at Saratoga in 1777. Using the prospect of an independent Papist Ireland on Protestant England's borders with Roman Catholics freely able to promote their faith in Britain, supporters of continuing the war played on widespread fears. British historian Robert Harvey argues that rejection of Catholics had been and would continue as an internal struggle in Great Britain for decades. Parliamentary treatment of Ireland, however, actually improved in response to the American rebellion; a non military revolution subsequently helped to keep the entire island in the United Kingdom into the Twentieth Century.<sup>19</sup>

Not everyone failed to understand the situation in America. Charles Carroll of Carrollton, a Maryland signer of the Declaration of Independence, correctly predicted at least as early as March 29, 1776 that the British army, however often victorious, could only succeed in holding the ground where it stood. It had not been defeated as much as rendered irrelevant by the choices of the civilian population. Carroll believed that Great Britain must be "an immense loser" in America because war fails as a weapon in subduing the human spirit. Frederick

Howard, the 5th Earl of Carlisle, while heading an official peace commission sent by Parliament to the Americans, similarly wrote to his wife as early as 1778 in words that would find echoes in many modern conflicts:

The leaders on the enemy's side are too powerful; the common people hate us in their hearts, notwithstanding all that is said of their secret attachment to the mother country. I cannot give you a better proof of their unanimity against us than in our last march; in the whole country there was not found one single man capable of bearing arms at home; they left their dwellings unprotected, and after having cut all of the ropes of the wells had fled to Gen. Washington. Formerly, when things went better for us, there was an appearance of friendship by their coming in for pardons, that might have deceived even those who had been the most acquainted with them. But no sooner our situation was in the least altered for the worse, but these friends were the first to fire on us, and many were taken with the pardons in our [sic, their] pockets. Beat Gen. Washington, drive away Monsr. d'Estaing, and we should have friends enough in the country; but in our present condition the only friends we have, or are likely to have, are those who are absolutely ruined for us [that is, those afraid, from experience, to express their loyalty openly], and in such distress [that is, as refugees protected and supported at British expense] I leave you to judge what possible use they can be to us.<sup>20</sup>

The war would so be decided democratically and not by special interests on either side of the Atlantic. By the winter of 1776, Americans in both armies would largely consist of foreign emigrants, former slaves, and landless whites. In the rebelling colonies, the general public would not aid the king's army in any way but, while the British public supported the war, it would not contribute soldiers and sailors. The end would come when one side finally saw no future in the continued struggle.

## II

On March 8, 1778, Lord Germain sent to General Sir Henry Clinton, British commander in North America and son of the former colonial governor of New York, a lengthy set of detailed instructions on how to conduct the operations in the Western Hemisphere of what had become a world war. The entry of France into the conflict postponed the start of the year's

campaign until the winter. Clinton then had to start a new march to somehow try to find and defeat Washington's army while defending his base at New York and returning 600 marines to Halifax. This list of what historian William B. Wilcox came to describe as "a collection of strategic fossils," only began with those basics. By the end of the year, Clinton also had to dispatch 5,000 men under Major General James Grant to invade the island of St. Lucia and 1,300 reinforcements under Brigadier General John Campbell of Strachur to British Pensacola in West Florida to protect that isolated colony. Sir Henry, not the first choice for his position and the fourth in a series of generals who failed in America from carrying out misguided orders from London, again tried to resign. By then, he may have given up on the British winning the war. Clinton certainly protested his orders:

You have but one army. 'Tis a good one; it has never been affronted. You may want it. You ought to have kept it together, nursed it, cherished it. By the present arrangement I wish one half of it may not be under ground by Christmas and the rest reduced to an ignominious fight to avoid still greater disgrace.<sup>21</sup>

The instructions from Germain also included orders for the invasion of Georgia. Clinton selected Scotsman and lieutenant colonel Archibald Campbell to command the campaign for reasons that now appears almost inexplicable. Campbell only learned of the existence of this expedition that he would be ordered to take to a place of which he knew nothing about in November on the night before its fleet sailed from New York and long after news of it had leaked to George Washington and the Continental Congress. John Fauchereau Grimké, an officer serving in a Whig invasion of Florida in mid May 1778 learned most of the details of the plan. Trained as an engineer, Campbell had little experience in command and would have suffered the disdain of officers like Sir Henry who owed their rank to being in the aristocracy rather than coming from Britain's rising and ambitious professional classes. The Scotsman claimed that jealousies among other officers caused Clinton to decline promoting him to

brigadier general, a rank commensurate with his responsibilities and which would have garnered more respect from the Americans.<sup>22</sup>

This expedition appeared, like its leader, hardly credible for the mission it undertook. Lieutenant Colonel Campbell's force consisted of only some 3,000 men in a collection of units of northern and southern Loyalists, with German battalions and two battalions of his own Seventy-first Fraser's Scots Highlander Infantry Regiment. The latter's officers received their rank only based upon success at recruitment and consequently its two battalions each reached regimental strength but not as a reflection of the competency of the men who commanded it. The regiment had been proclaimed by the British government as made up of elite and martial "Highlanders"; the Declaration of Independence declared them Scottish mercenaries; and the state of Georgia would outlaw Scottish immigrants because of them. In reality, however, at least some Irishmen and also Englishmen impressed from the dregs of society, and of questionable physical qualities, filled its ranks. Some of the companies saw more than a fair share of fighting, even without having received proper drill, but others suffered capture upon arrival in America and would remain prisoners until 1778. (By the time of Yorktown, however, the Seventy-first had fought more than any other British unit and had almost ceased to exist from its casualties.)

Campbell, one of the early prisoners of war, took command of its depleted ranks in 1778, just before the Georgia expedition. He no experience in commanding troops. The fleet transporting this army also proved to have serious shortcomings, including exceedingly poor mismanagement that appeared suspiciously like sabotage made worse by the foul weather.<sup>23</sup>

Sir Henry Clinton may have simply divided his limited forces as best he could to meet Germain's many and unrealistic demands but he may also have dispatched the highest ranking officer he could afford to lose, with the troops that the British army least needed, on what he



regarded as a strategic mistake imposed upon him by his micromanaging superior thousands of miles away in London.

Clinton and his superiors certainly had plenty of historical experience that would cast doubts on this feasibility of this strategy. The brief, but bloody, failed British occupation of Manila in 1760s demonstrated, according to historian Fred Anderson that: “Armed force could conquer lands and peoples, but only voluntary cooperation could maintain imperial control. Wherever the conquered withheld their consent, the empire’s sway extended only as far as the range of its guns.”<sup>24</sup> Caesar Rodney famously hurried back to Philadelphia to vote for independence from helping to crush a Loyalist uprising in Delaware with deep roots in the colony’s past. The British occupation of New Jersey included a restored colonial militia but that only created a civil war built around a conflict between various local ethnic groups and personal vendetta. Loyalists, now in power, sought revenge for past grievances and thus encouraged hatred among other Americans against the occupying British army. Within months, the state’s 120,000 militiamen had driven out the British and left the King’s forces and friends as besieged in New York as they had earlier been in Boston.<sup>25</sup>

Sir Henry Clinton had every reason to believe that an invasion of the South would be an even greater fiasco and would result in the same destruction of frontier Loyalist support in the North that had occurred during the Saratoga Campaign of 1777. He had himself led an expedition to attempt to reach the southern Loyalists in 1775-1776 that had resulted in giving the rebels morale boosting victories at Charleston, South Carolina, and over the Loyalists who did rally in the backcountry. To try to simultaneously implement so many plans now he felt would only incite more Americans against the king’s cause while resulting in anyone who did come forward suffering retaliation at the hands of his rebel neighbors.<sup>26</sup> Clinton entrusted one of the most critical roles in the Georgia campaign, the covert recruitment of the Loyalists, to

someone vaguely referred to as “Boyd” (a man whom he may have never met) further questions the general’s faith in this expedition’s chances for success.<sup>27</sup>

The inexperienced Archibald Campbell, however, successfully led his *ad hoc* untried command to Georgia. On December 29, 1778, executing the common British tactic of a frontal assault combined with a surprise movement around the left flank, His troops defeated a professional American army and captured the colonial capital of Savannah on December 29, 1778. He then linked up with troops from neighboring East Florida and boasted, after subsequently overrunning the rest of Revolutionary War Georgia, of being the first officer to tear a star and stripe from the rebel flag. Campbell used his commission as the royal civil governor of Georgia to receive oaths of allegiance from almost 1,800 men, the largest part of the male population of military age, whom he hastily organized into companies of a reconstituted colonial militia.<sup>28</sup>

Most of these men, however, quickly returned to the Whig cause or fled once Campbell and his troops moved on, an echo of what the British encountered in New Jersey in 1776. The experience with the Wilkes County frontier in early February 1779 proved typical. A Mr. Freeman, a delegation of Quakers from Wrightsborough, and a group of Baptists arrived in the British camp at Augusta to offer the surrender of the settlements in that last area of Georgia. Campbell sent then Captains John Hamilton and Dugald Campbell with their Loyalist horsemen through the Kettle Creek-Wilkes County frontier to receive the voluntary submissions of that population and to find Boyd and his Loyalists. Captains Hamilton and Campbell, while reportedly working in conjunction with Daniel McGirth’s bandits, forced the submission of these last outposts before being surrounded and nearly forced to surrender by

enemy militiamen under Andrew Pickens and John Dooly at Robert Carr's Fort, near Kettle Creek. Hamilton later related to a British historian, that:

although many of the people came in to take the oath of allegiance, the professions of a considerable number were not to be depended upon; and that some came in only for the purpose of gaining information on his strength and future designs.<sup>29</sup>

Lieutenant Colonel Archibald Campbell foresaw the results of his campaign even as it unfolded. His superiors in New York had assured him of a reinforcement of 6,000 Carolinians, as well as significant numbers of Indian allies. In a memoir he wrote of how his expectations steadily declined. By the time his troops had penetrated the backcountry and captured Augusta as the planned place of rendezvous with Boyd on January 31, 1779, Campbell had lowered his expectations to 1,000 Americans coming to his standard. Although reports arrived in Georgia that thousands of Loyalists had gathered on the Saluda River in South Carolina, Boyd's uprising actually numbered, on its best day, only some 500 to 800 men of questionable value to fulfilling British aspirations. In Great Britain, a report arrived that this uprising had consisted of only 350 men!<sup>30</sup>

During the early hours of February 14, 1779, Campbell had his troops to evacuate Augusta and the Georgia backcountry. Plans to make a surprise attack against the growing numbers of American troops across the Savannah River fell apart as his command increasingly risked being cut off from their base near the coast. Backcountry Americans, "Crackers" as he called them, who had joined his expedition frequently engaged in plundering that alerted the enemy of any movements made by Campbell's troops. On February 3, 300 Charleston militia and twenty Continentals under General William Moultrie stopped a diversionary raid by 200 British regulars at Beaufort, South Carolina. Outposts that Campbell had set up to protect his route back to Savannah began to fall to Whig horsemen. These small victories illustrated to all

the weakness of the size of the British expeditionary force and demonstrated that the Redcoats could be beaten. Campbell's troops at Augusta increasingly looked like they would be the next isolated detachment to suffer capture in another Saratoga. He had heard no news of Boyd and his army had also run out of rum, a dangerous circumstance in any eighteenth century military including Indian war parties; consequences ranged from soldiers refusing to fight to armed violence against their officers. Upon returning to Savannah, the British soldiers reportedly threatened mutiny and assaulted Brigadier General Augustin Prévost when he failed to supply their almost mandatory allotment of drink. Campbell thus lived the scenario envisioned by the Earl of Carlisle in 1778. Shortly afterwards, the lieutenant colonel learned of Boyd and many of his officers having been killed at Kettle Creek on the same morning that he had evacuated Augusta. Captain Hamilton rescued the 270 survivors of the battle from where they had found refuge at Wrightsborough.<sup>31</sup>

The final blows to the Southern Strategy in Georgia in 1779 soon fell. Col. Leroy Hammond, a former Augusta merchant, commanded a force of South Carolina horsemen who had provided almost the only resistance to the British advance on Augusta. He also led these men in harassing the enemy's retreat, including capturing the capture of an outpost and even a party of Boyd's men under Aquila Hall. The few Georgians still willing to take up muskets for the British cause tried rally at outposts where they could be supported by Loyalist provincials and even British regulars. Andrew Williamson described one such fort "as a Strong Stockade with a square Log House built in the middle of it, two Storeys high."<sup>32</sup> Hammond and others led attacks on such strongholds that decimated the king's men and proved that the British could not protect their allies outside of the fortified lines around Savannah. Of the promised Cherokee and Creek Indian allies only some 600 warriors came to Georgia and they largely went home after

clashing with the same militiamen who had dealt an end to Boyd's expedition at Kettle Creek. On March 3, 1779, the king's regular troops did attack and destroy an American army of North Carolina and Georgia troops that had camped at Briar Creek, Georgia, in preparation for an attempt to retake Savannah, but still another British success in a fixed formal battle that brought the king's cause not closer to victory could hardly have justified the risks of the invasion of Georgia. To add insult to injury, the Redcoats found oaths of loyalty to the king issued by Campbell in the pockets of dead and captured Americans.<sup>33</sup>

General Augustin Prévost, the British commander in Georgia, despite constantly seeking the favor of his superiors, still dared to inform them that what little American support that had existed in the South had been eliminated by acts of terrorism committed against the Loyalists by their neighbors. He reportedly made no effort to create or arm a Loyalist militia and thus encouraged them to form or join bandit gangs. He withheld supplies and other support from His Majesty's Americans and hardly used them for more than as cannon fodder. Prévost felt that the any success to be found in the region would only come at the hands of the regular British army.

Sir Henry Clinton concurred with Prévost. He wrote that any benefits from American support specifically in the Georgia campaign had cost more than its value. The British navy, army, and engineers that served so well in formal battle proved of limited use in fighting a guerilla war waged on land and water. Overall across America, the insurgents, by contrast, survived and were strengthened on booty taken in their raids on fixed camps, supply trains, and outposts; they also gained by deserters from the enemy army who supplied the new American army with badly needed training and who would help to fill rebel ranks from drill sergeants to generals.<sup>34</sup>

The Southern Strategy lived on, however, despite the rebels having acquired by 1779 all of what has become, as demonstrated in modern times in such places as Vietnam, Afghanistan, and Iraq, the classic ingredients for a successful rebellion: a widespread view of the occupying army as foreign invader, effective weapons for individual resistance fighters, and foreign support. Germain reinstated Governor Sir James Wright and his colonial government in Georgia. Historian Edward F. DeLancey would argue a century later that had the British (Knox's) plans for this campaign been followed and the war kept in South Carolina, William Knox's goal of saving at least one of the thirteen colonies could have been implemented and would have had a profound effect on the further settlement of North America. "But," he wrote, "to the misfortunes of America and injury of Great Britain, a strange kind of fatality was evident in all proceedings during the continuance of the American Revolution."<sup>35</sup> In 1779, while the king's army continued to seek the rumored legions of Loyalist soldiers, rebel leaders like Pickens, Dooly, and Clarke used small bands of riflemen to effectively defeat Loyalists, Indians, and Redcoats. Such Americans, far from rallying to the king's standard, confined the area of restored colonial rule to no more than the range of British muskets and bayonets. Wright had hardly returned to his former province when he wrote that weak Loyalist support necessitated a continued rule by the military.<sup>36</sup>

Ignoring the lessons of the failed occupation of New Jersey in 1776, the Burgoyne campaign in the North in 1777 and of Campbell's experience in Georgia in 1779, Sir Henry Clinton used almost all of his available forces in 1780 in an attempt to make the Southern Strategy work with a temporary, focused increase in resources. He laid siege to Charleston, South Carolina, and it surrendered, avenging his failure to take the city years earlier, with almost all regular American troops in the South on May 12, 1780. Clinton soon after returned to New

York with most of his army to leave Lord Cornwallis with the responsibility for finding the still undiscovered way to make the Southern Strategy work and to win the war. Sir Henry would largely sit out the rest of the conflict in New York. The red coated soldiers defeated still another American army in a formal battle near Camden, South Carolina on August 16. Efforts by rebel leaders such as Andrew Williamson and Elijah Clarke to wage a guerilla war largely failed. Thomas Sumter made the most classic and usually fatal mistake that a partisan leader could make when he concentrated all of the remaining guerilla groups, some 1,000 men, at Blackstocks, South Carolina, on November 20, 1780 for an attack on the enemy outpost at Ninety Six, South Carolina. The resulting battle ended as an American tactical victory. British commander Banastre Trelton, leading the regulars of the Seventy-First Regiment and the Americans of his own Legion, however, rightly considered it a great strategic success for the king's cause as it resulted in the dispersing and discrediting of the remaining rebel partisan resistance in the South. Historian John E. Ferling makes a compelling argument that, overall, during the winter of 1780-1781 the American rebellion reached a near fatal low.<sup>37</sup>

Such rebel missteps, however, failed to provide the British cause with what it needed most, a realistic means or even definition of victory. The army successfully overran all of Georgia and most of South Carolina, while organizing militias as Campbell had done, but it still failed to create a credible native American military force for reclaiming the rebellious colonies. By the end of 1780, they had revisited the experience of Georgia in February 1779 but on a larger scale. The Americans who had initially joined the rebels but who now found themselves legally compelled to serve in the king's militia proved to be of little military value. The formal Loyalist provincial units in the South had to disobey orders and enlist prisoners of war to fill their ranks as they steadily declined in numbers from an inability to replace casualties and deserters. Before learning of the total destruction of his corps of 900 provincials and militia by

an equal number of frontier riflemen at King's Mountain, South Carolina, in 1780, Lord Charles Cornwallis wrote despondently of his Americans. Overall, despite the fact that they had been well trained in the use of the musket and bayonet, and outnumbered Washington's army, they proved to be "dastardly and pusillanimous"; arming his militia, in essence, amounted to giving weapons to the rebels. A year later, he warned Germain that the backcountry of no colony could be held. Historians later noted that most of the men responsible for the destruction of his Loyalists at King's Mountain had traveled hundreds of miles from today's Tennessee, on their own initiative and leaving their families vulnerable to Indian attack, for the opportunity to kill other Americans who served voluntarily as provincials and the men conscripted into the colonial militia. A South Carolinian wrote:

The greatest cause of the Militia not turning out so well as was perhaps expected was the atrocious cruelties exercised upon them whenever they fell into the hands of the Rebel Militia, cruelties so great that they exceed all belief and were they to be mentioned in England would be generally rejected as the exaggerations of a heated fancy.<sup>38</sup>

The British needed but had failed to seek a means of winning what today would be called "hearts and minds." Without such a strategy, as shown in numerous modern conflicts, the occupying army defaults to a military policy of subjugation, counter-insurgency, and defeat. From the beginnings of the Revolution in Boston in 1775, the strategy for victory had been literally or psychologically to bludgeon the American people into at least temporary submission by such means as arming slaves, allying with the Indians, and purchasing foreign mercenaries. Its army, like most armies, understood fighting an enemy in formal battle rather than using diplomatic skills to obtain even local cooperation. British commanders had little use for a people whom they regarded as lacking the basic discipline as soldiers that they believed came more naturally to Europeans, even as the Americans, even undisciplined, used their independent spirit



successfully in guerilla warfare. France, America's enemy in the French and Indian War, did enter the war on the side of the Revolution, with its own African-Caribbean and German troops, but it seldom made a public appearance and did nothing to occupy cities in America.<sup>39</sup>

Germain saw using existing American support as a tool for ending the war and then by subjugation rather than reconciliation. The men charged with carrying out the Southern Strategy failed to consider converting the other Americans to the colonial cause, however, despite Knox's recommendations to the contrary. From the King to the lowliest conscripted soldier who had been brutalized into a rum drunk maniacal unthinking killer, no one had any concept of reconciliation or moderation including even Banastre Tarleton, Patrick Ferguson, and Thomas Brown, Englishmen who led American Loyalist troops but who advocated fire and sword policies without any regard for raising local animosity. Savannah's pro-British *Royal Georgia Gazette* even carried an editorial that listed the horrors inflicted upon Georgia's civilians in grim detail but excused this violence as simply common to war and to be excused. British officials expected the Americans to come forward out of fear or from gratitude at being rescued from anarchy so much so as to be willing to be abused and held in suspicion by the British military establishment, much as the king's troops had treated Americans as allies with disastrous results in the French and Indian War. The army's leadership made only minimal efforts and at the least expense of recruiting any Americans. While using the Loyalists who did enlist as "cannon fodder" to spare the regular troops from guerilla warfare, officers like the Prévosts called their Americans bandits and raised questions about the courage and discipline of these men who too often sacrificed their lives for the King's cause. The survivors of the Kettle Creek campaign who reached the king's army, for example, received nothing more in compensation for their sacrifices than Archibald Campbell taking them drinking, an expense that His Majesty's auditors later disallowed. He had no authority to pay them. The 30,000

Loyalists who did bear arms by the war's end became martyrs to the short sightedness of Germain and the king's military.<sup>40</sup>

Two centuries later, in remembering Vietnam, poet Adrienne Rich unintentionally described the situation in the American Revolution with regards to the treatment of Americans: "A patriot [true Loyalist] is not a weapon. A patriot is one who wrestles for the soul of her country as she wrestles for her own being, for the soul of his country, as he wrestles for his own being. A patriot is a citizen trying to wake from the burnt-out dream of innocence. . ."<sup>41</sup> Men like Thomas Brown, Boyd of Kettle Creek, John Moore, John Spurgeon, and Henry Sharp risked and sometimes gave their lives to lead their fellow "good Americans" in a war to save colonial America for the king. Colonel John Thomas of Georgia, for example, openly joined the rebellion after the arrival of the news of the battles of Concord and Lexington only to undergo arrest when he decided to become a Loyalist in 1778. He would suffer a severe wound and later imprisonment for fighting for the king in 1779. Lieutenant Colonel James Ingram of Richmond County similarly made an impassioned plea to his fellow Georgians to resist the British in January 1779, on the eve of the Patriot success at the battle of Burke County Jail but before, like Benedict Arnold, he became a defeatist and an equally dedicated Loyalist officer.<sup>42</sup>

General Sir Henry Clinton made these matters worse before leaving for New York from his temporary southern campaign by ordering almost all men in Georgia and South Carolina to serve in the restored colonial militia, including the rebels who had surrendered and received paroles. By this action, he inadvertently allowed the latter, including men like Andrew Pickens, to feel released from their paroles to return to the war and to resume serving the resistance. At that same time, such Loyalists leaders as Sir James Wright called for the strongest measures to be taken against the former Whigs as punishment and

for purposes of intimidation. By that process, they moved what had been a revolution within a revolution that became one group of Americans resisting other Americans who opposed British colonial rule, to a still even more complex and violent societal crisis. Whatever hopes of pacifying the population in Georgia and South Carolina that existed would degenerate into a civil war between ethnic groups and even personal vendetta, as it had when the Loyalists took revenge during the failed British occupation of a submissive New Jersey in 1776.

In September 1780, Elijah Clarke led Georgia and South Carolina guerrillas in attacking and nearly capturing Brown and the Loyalist and Indian garrison in Augusta. Rescued and reinforced by South Carolina Loyalist provincials, the long suffering Tories and Indians then began a campaign of retaliation as they went from being the oppressed to the avenged, starting with the executions of men captured during Clarke's attack on the Augusta garrison. From John Dooly's home, Loyalist Lieutenant Colonel John Harris Cruger announced the arrival of his troops in Wilkes County. He dispatched the local colonial militia under Thomas Waters and others to destroy the forts, courthouse, and settlements. Wright reported that at least 100 homes were destroyed. Families whose men were not serving in the king's militia went into exile with Elijah Clarke or became prisoners confined in Augusta. Colonel John Dooly had nothing to do with Clarke's attack but died at that time, likely murdered directly, or indirectly, as part of Cruger's pogrom.<sup>43</sup>

Brown, Wright, and others justified this action as eliminating a class of brigands from the Georgia frontier who had been causing troubles there since before the war. They unapologetically redefined a political conflict as class warfare that transcended the period of the American Revolution. As a British sympathizer wrote:

Clarke's party is said to have consisted of men, whose restless dispositions, or whose crimes prevented their living in any country where even the resemblance of government was maintained, and therefore taking themselves to the vacant lands on the frontiers; living without any control; they made inroads upon the industrious inhabitants of the back settlements, and have frequently involved the Province in wars with the Indians.<sup>44</sup>

Too late, Loyalist leaders discovered that Clarke's relatively small band had consisted, as had Boyd's Tories had a year before, largely of a few apolitical bandits and many more men who went along only under threats to their lives and property. The attack on Wilkes County, and its subsequent repetition on the South Carolina, drove hundreds of Americans from trying to escape the war into active participants, if only as a matter of self defense. Little information beyond legend explains why the frontiersmen of today's Tennessee left their families at risk of Indian attack to travel hundreds of miles to annihilate a corps of the king's loyal Americans at the battle of King's Mountain on October 7, 1780 but they may have come to the conclusion that, politics aside, they faced removal or even extinction at the hands of British troops and allies of all colors.

Lord Charles Cornwallis, commanding His Majesty's forces in the South, also made a classic mistake in suppressing a rebellion in his declining to curtail what today observers would call "ethnic cleansing" or "genocide" except that culture and race only indirectly defined the conflict. This general felt more comfortable with building fortified outposts, conducting marches, and fighting formal fixed battles than in establishing civil governments or implementing some populist peace making scheme. Cornwallis pursued a hope for victory around the already failed strategy of destroying the formal military of the rebels and, with it, somehow their ability to continue their civil war to success. American Generals Nathanael Greene and Daniel Morgan thwarted those questionable aspirations. Beyond failing to reach out

to or pacify the population, the actions of Cornwallis, Clinton, and others all contributed to reigniting the fighting. Outposts set up as bases for completing the pacification of Georgia and South Carolina became besieged refuges where British and Loyalist troops, with their families, awaited surrender/evacuation (as at Augusta) or rescue/evacuation (as at Ninety Six). Rear areas, such as Georgia, were stripped of troops and then became vulnerable to partisan and bandit attacks. Disreputable persons such as Daniel McGirth were given commissions by desperate colonial officials only to destroy what semblance of respect that royal authority had when such men used their positions to aid them in committing robberies. These remaining loyal Americans came to call for the removal of the British army. Overall, the campaigns in South Carolina, according to Historian Henry Lumpkin, resulted in an estimated 1,200 dead and wounded British and Loyalist soldiers with another 1,286 men taken prisoner. Their enemy's losses, however, were only 497 killed and wounded, with another 320 men taken as prisoners. In the end, the only achievements of these campaigns were to give South Carolina the distinction reputation of having more Revolutionary War battlefields than any other state and to have left Georgia, overall, the state most thoroughly devastated by the Revolution and with more widespread loss of property than during the Civil War (1861-1876).<sup>45</sup>

Each half of the tepid partnership of necessity between Loyalist and Redcoat had mistakenly believed that the other would somehow find a way to undermine a broad based, well organized, and often violently ruthless independence oriented native rebellion that now only had to refuse to surrender in order to succeed. Had the regular American armies been thoroughly defeated, the Continental Congress bankrupted, and the French government compelled to abandon its support of the American cause, the mere 30,000 British and German soldiers would still have had to occupy almost every town, county, and state in America to subdue a population of some 2,500,000 Americans, almost all of whom had joined in some

form of resistance, if not open rebellion, against the king. A temporary increase of military force as in 1777 and 1780 initially could give an appearance of hope for success but it failed to address the reasons why the British war effort continued to fail. Holmes argues, as late as 1778, months before the Loyalist catastrophe at the battle of Kettle Creek, the British no longer had a viable long game plan in America.<sup>46</sup>

Some Loyalists foresaw the outcome of the war before many British leaders. Native Englishman and American explorer William Lee, for example, came to Georgia in 1780 as he had heard that it had been pacified. He discovered a reality so very different that he had to abandon his wife and new born child to flee for his life. Seaman Samuel Kelly would find British occupied Charleston a very different place from the beautiful city he remembered as a child. When the war began, this one port supplied almost all of British America south of New Jersey with enough goods to keep hundreds of wagons employed. Kelly now found a deforested wasteland of abandoned houses and ruins. He blamed the change upon the direct violence of the war but also on the degrading effects of the presence of the military in a defensive siege posture and the accommodation of the refugees.<sup>47</sup> The same situation had prevailed a year earlier with the British occupation of Charleston and even earlier in New York. A concentration of soldiers and refugees, under an informal siege, resulted in the cities where disease and decay became rampant due to limited stores of food and of space.

### III

On March 11, 1779, a disenchanted Archibald Campbell left the South and his doomed regiment forever to marry and to find other venues for his considerable ambitions.<sup>48</sup> Why did he fail to find the thousands of American recruits he had been assured awaited only his arrival to march to the king's standard? Frontiersmen, like the "Over the Mountain men" at the battle of

King's Mountain left few expressions of their ideals or motivations but the political issues affecting backcountry residents sometimes surface by implication. During the last years of the French and Indian Wars, Great Britain had made allies of the Americans in their mutual conflict but especially in the backcountry. That century of warfare had represented an earlier and more striking example of a European nation (France) supporting the original ethnic minority groups on the frontier (different Indian nations and their white allies) in a heroic but doomed struggle against the much greater Protestant American majority. It had been in the battlefields of that war that the colonials like George Washington, Benjamin Franklin, and Andrew Pickens had first seen the weaknesses of the king's regular military establishment and something of the power of what they could accomplish for themselves in their own environment.<sup>49</sup>

With the peace that followed, the relationship between Great Britain and America as a whole fluctuated between mutual indifference and that of master and fractious subjects. Usually more conflict existed within individual colonies than anger at the home country. As late as 1780, Georgia's colonial Chief Justice James Simpson reviewed the Loyalist situation in Georgia and South Carolina. He concluded that the people of the backcountry would support the king because the rebels/Whigs largely came from the coastal society's traditional frontier enemies.<sup>50</sup> Before the Revolution, the colonies had violent internal unrest which contributed to the group conflict of the later war. During the North Carolina Regulator Rebellion of 1764 to 1771, for example, as many as 6,000 frontiersmen, some three-quarters of the adult males on the frontier, rose up against corrupt local governments with connections to the coastal elite. Governor William Tryon would lead the coastal militia in crushing that resistance and in executing six of its ringleaders.<sup>51</sup> South Carolina's great colonial conflict of the same name (1767-1771) involved vigilante backcountry communities suppressing bands of thieves while pressuring the colonial government to establish and finance rule of law on the frontier. (Although two thirds or more of

the total population of South Carolina lived in the backcountry, the low country port of Charleston had the colony's only court and local government.)<sup>52</sup>

America's growing political resistance attempted to embrace the cause of the regulators and it drew great sympathy from Josiah Martin, William Tryon's successor as governor, but in North Carolina, the word "Regulator" became popular slang for anyone who opposed the American Revolution although early historian David Ramsey wrote that veterans of the South Carolina Regulator Rebellion became Whigs. To many frontiersmen, the later Revolution did appear as only a continuation of their struggle against political domination by the coastal elite as many of the North Carolina Patriot leadership had suppressed the colony's frontier political resistance. John Ashe, for example, a leader under Tryon in 1771 and later becoming a major general of the Revolution only seemed to confirm that impression. Some members of the minority communities did serve in the Regulator struggles but in order to fight for the goals, ideals, and traditions of their respective ethnocentric settlements.<sup>53</sup>

Historian Jack Greene saw these struggles as part of the ambitions of the frontier's majority population for "improvements" that included a hierarchical social structure which sought unrestricted commercialization and exploitation of slaves, Indians, and other minorities.<sup>54</sup> People of the backcountry sought change to create opportunities beyond limitations set by the old colonial system. The British government had done little for the people of the backcountry beyond protecting the rights and privileges of enclosed ethnic minority communities. Although the issues of tea and taxes in Boston would hardly have affected these people, the majority had to wonder, after reading the accounts in the colonial gazettes, about loyalty to a distant government that sent troops to kill dissenting Americans in coastal cities instead of to the frontier to protect settlements from Indian attacks. Contrary to the images left



by observers like the William Bartram, Charles Woodmason, and William Mylne, and others, many of the people of the backcountry had ambitions beyond being ignorant wandering herdsmen living in a wilderness. The history of the family of Colonel John Dooly, the commander of the Georgians at Kettle Creek, represents the rising aspirations of a growing class of ambitious “professional” frontier entrepreneurs. His father Patrick likely began in America as a butcher in Philadelphia, one of the European emigrants to the backcountry from mercantile/merchant urban backgrounds. In Virginia and later in South Carolina, Patrick, his growing family, and his few slaves developed tracts of land of a few hundred acres each that, prior to 1774, the king had allowed to be granted virtually for free. Although he did serve in the militia, his movements seem to follow the peace with the Indians as it moved across the British colonies with the conclusion of the French and Indian wars, 1759-1763. Patrick would sell his lands to later arrivals before repeating the process of land development on later frontiers until his death in 1768. He had a blacksmith or wheelwright shop. He owned books which suggest that he worked as a teacher and/or minister. Patrick Dooly’s son John continued the same upward mobility but his land ownership totaled thousands of acres and more slaves. He supplemented his income by becoming a surveyor and a merchant. In 1773, at the height of the prosperity that followed the end of the South Carolina Regulator Rebellion, John sold much of his property and borrowed large sums of money for a new real estate venture on the frontier of what would become Wilkes County, Georgia. He died in 1780 at the hands of Loyalists, or at least by someone he had crossed in his frequently questionable dealings. His younger brother George, after avenging the deaths of at least three brothers that had occurred during the American Revolution, would move on to Kentucky where he would receive grants for tens of thousands of acres and own more slaves. Upon his death in 1821, he left his slave children emancipation and part of his estate.<sup>55</sup>

The rebels (or Whigs), in contrast to British colonial leaders, recognized the menace and the potential of ambitious men like the Doolys and worked to obtain their support. They effectively used propaganda, persecution, and promotion to win over merchants, millers, and blacksmiths, local leaders in the backcountry who could then influence their neighbors. Joseph Maddock, Herman Husband, and a John Boyd all had mills near the North Carolina Quaker meeting houses. Whig currency in Georgia and elsewhere carried a depiction of a frontier rifleman and the revolutionaries initially reached out to such later prominent Loyalists as Moses Kirkland, John Thomas, Daniel McGirth, Thomas Waters, and others. Important men who did not actively work against the Revolution, like Jonas Bedford and George Galphin went undisturbed. The fact that each colony had a centralized government in a coastal capital aided the revolutionaries, who, in the main, lived in those same cities and who could rally local support there over such issues such as trade and taxes. In any revolution, controlling the government, newspapers, speech, and ministry proves a great boon in gaining recruits, silencing opposition, and intimidating those individuals who lack commitment to either cause. In America, almost all government centered in the coastal cities where the rebels also drew their greatest support, and quickly controlled, facilitating the rule of entire colonies.<sup>56</sup> With shifts in power during the war, few men could hardly have been clearly classed as Loyalist or Whig for all of 1775 to 1783 but restoration of British control came too little and too late to regain any real authority.<sup>57</sup>

The Whigs also addressed backcountry concerns about the Indians and, in doing so, inadvertently, helped to doom the yet to be former British plans to restore the southern colonies. The Southern Strategy included using Indians and slaves, or at least the fear of using them, as well as groups of white minorities. Moses Kirkland of Raeburn Creek and his plan for

a combined campaign by Indians and the British army upon Georgia and South Carolina fell into Whig hands. While these three categories of Americans, even combined, failed to provide sufficient military forces, they did pressure the white majority of southerners to joining the Whig cause.<sup>58</sup> Widespread conflict had gone on between the two great notoriously violent and continuous frontier cultures for decades with only periods of cease fire interspersed between relentless campaigns of what today is termed “ethnic cleansing.” This conflict had manifestations that went beyond the presumed conflict over land, game, cattle, and horses; even the physical size and appearance of the Indian warriors intimidated and awed the frontiersmen. Whether the king’s agents did, as charged in the Declaration of Independence, set the “savages” against the settlers, the Indians had steadily moved, during the Revolution, from war as a means of showing courage by capturing foes to the European practice of immediate killing in order to physically eliminate enemies in battle. A chain of forts essentially marked the white frontier from Canada to Florida and thus displayed the fear of the backcountry families. On Raeburn’s Creek in 1759-1760, the home of many of the Loyalists who later marched to Georgia, more than thirty people reportedly died in Cherokee attacks. The American Revolution became the latest in a series of ultimately unsuccessful Native American wars for independence. British agents tried at least as often as not keep the Indians neutral, however, and some elements of the Creek nation left them open to the best offer from either side.<sup>59</sup>

The Kettle Creek area, because of its proximity to the major Creek Indian trading path, had a bloody past that well represented the most desperate of such life and death conflict on the western borderlands. It had been first settled as the Brandon settlement by a few white families from Virginia that critics called rogues led by “pretending Quaker” Edmund Gray in the 1750s. Resettled in 1774 as part of the Ceded Lands, what became Wilkes County, it sustained evacuation that same year when Creek attacks on two families and the rout of the local militia

terrorized the new settlers. They returned, only to face assaults from their Indian neighbors every year from 1776 to the end of the American Revolution. The Kettle Creek families would “fort up” at Robert Carr’s fort at the fork on nearby Beaverdam Creek until an Indian raiding party of eleven warriors entered that refuge in the spring of 1779 and burned the buildings. The Creeks killed illiterate Captain Robert Carr, probably a veteran of the battle of Kettle Creek, although his family escaped in their night shirts. The relatively well off Carrs left behind almost everything that they owned: horses, cattle, beds, pewter, table ware, basic clothes, a silk hat, and a Cardinal cloak. Local people subsequently would move to Robert McNabb’s fort on Kettle Creek for safety but Indian raiders destroyed it in 1778 and again in 1781 before killing McNabb and his men in an ambush on January 3, 1782 while his fort again came under siege. Seven months before the battle of Kettle Creek, the South Carolina militiamen who would fight there had also come to the aid of Colonel John Dooly and his Wilkes County militiamen against the Indians and they would do so many times in the years that followed. A faction in Wilkes County sought to make war with the neighboring Creeks and to end the business of the white men who traded with the Indians as a means to force a peace while acquiring Creek lands.<sup>60</sup>

When the Cherokees attacked the frontier in 1776 southerners launched multi-state, coordinated expeditions that devastated the villages in that nation. Many of the frontiersmen who had previously marched with the Loyalists joined in that campaign and would remain figuratively and literally in the rebel camp afterwards. Whether British Indian agent John Stuart primarily tried to keep the peace or organize Indians to attack the frontier remains a matter for debate but white frontiersmen by 1776 believed that the king’s agents encouraged these most feared enemies to war on the backcountry. Training, weapons, and organization needed for

fighting the Indians subsequently served the frontiersmen in their later battles against the Loyalists and British regulars in the American Revolution.<sup>61</sup>

By 1779, Elijah Clarke, John Dooly, and Andrew Pickens, the Whig commanders at Kettle Creek, had all led men in battle against the Indians and all three had participated in the 1776 campaign. Such dedicated soldiers, meeting today's definition of "warlord," had thus proven themselves and could inspire, persuade, and lead very different men. By the time of the battle of Kettle Creek, Elijah Clarke had been wounded at least twice in the war, fighting Cherokees in Georgia in 1776 and in battle against Thomas Brown's Loyalist provincials in Florida in 1778. John Dooly had lost a brother to an Indian attack in 1777 and had tried to hold a Creek Indian delegation as hostages for satisfaction for that death. Pickens would come to spend time, as a prisoner of the British, in the same jail at Ninety Six, South Carolina, that had held the condemned Loyalists captured at Kettle Creek.<sup>62</sup>

By 1779, such men and the thousands of their neighbors who followed them already had defined the Revolution as their local interests against any opposition. Before the war began, the backcountry had moved economically from what historian Margaret Ellen Newell described as dependency to independence, a change that she attributes to bringing about the American Revolution in New England.<sup>63</sup> Conversely, British leaders had failed to realize that, in the backcountry, how best to continue the political, economic, and social progress that the people had been making for themselves since the 1760s mattered more than which government ruled. Reasons for the Southern Strategy's failure include the misidentification by Knox and other planners of the coincidental American Revolution as a rebellion against "government" and in support of "anarchy" rather than as a phase in a widespread social evolution towards self-determination. A better British plan would have embraced those aspirations but a mindset that failed to recruit people for its cause would hardly have understood and taken advantage of their

ambitions. American rule, however, would in time bring about more land for development, expansion of slavery, and the type of local government with the effective and honest civil authority sought by the Regulators. The settlers around Kettle Creek established a Presbyterian church on or just north of the battlefield that they named “Liberty” that likely included the cemetery begun there by the battle. It served as more than a sentiment for by then that word referred not to the concept of civil or human rights but merely the side that fought against the British occupation. Clarke, Dooly, and Pickens would become notables in the new order. Georgia would name counties for all three; counties in three states honor the memory of Andrew Pickens. Their sons would have important political careers in state capitals established after the war on what often had been British dominated Indian lands during the Revolution.<sup>64</sup>

This frontier empowerment did have a negative side as well. Many Americans who had sacrificed for the Revolution found the new country as alien, restrictive, and hostile as did their Loyalist counterparts. Undetermined numbers of such disenchanted Whigs would also seek and find their own independence by joining in the post war emigration to British, French, Spanish, and later Mexican territories, in some instances protecting those provinces from acquisition the United States and, at other times, aiding in such mergers. Some of the Americans who remained would answer Herman Husband’s call to resist the new national government in the Whiskey Rebellion. Such prominent Patriots as John Sevier, George Rogers Clark, Thomas Sumter, and other backcountry leaders would come to conspire against or outside of the interests of the country they had risked so much to help found. Elijah Clarke of Kettle Creek fame, for example, would lead his followers in private campaigns against Spanish East Florida and in an unsuccessful effort to found an independent republic on the Oconee Indian frontier all in opposition to the policies of then President George Washington and his new government.<sup>65</sup>

#### IV

Why then did anyone risk so much to support the king's cause as to find himself hundreds of miles from home, in hostile territory, on Kettle Creek on the morning of February 14, 1779? Aside from the grand ambitions of the British leaders, the events that led to Kettle Creek and its like battles share a lost history found only by understanding the collective consciousness of settlements on Raeburn Creek, South Carolina, and in Tryon County, North Carolina, from where most of the Kettle Creek Tories hailed. Arthur Dobbs, later colonial governor of North Carolina, wrote as early as the 1720s that Great Britain had been fighting and losing what modern observers could call "a cold war" with its own American subjects for the control of colonies, but especially for the vast unrealized wealth of the frontier, for more than a century. He urged Britain to regain its authority in its New World holdings with a chain of strategic forts that would control the orderly development of the backcountry as well as manage relations and trade with the Indians.<sup>66</sup>

Dobbs' advice went unheeded. Inherent dangers and the sparseness of the frontier population instead led to the creation of independent self supporting societal islands. Individual colonial governments created townships by setting aside reserves for specific ethnic and cultural groups, offering these exclusive areas to people of shared cultural commonality as inducements to develop the best lands in the backcountry. At the same time, the British government did little in the way of controlling the settlement of the American frontier beyond enforcing its usual policy of the toleration of such minorities, people who then and during American Revolution naturally supported a system viewed by them as benevolent and to which they owed so much. Robert Harvey has argued that the king's government even became a guardian of Indians and slaves.<sup>67</sup>

The exclusive but very different minority groups in the backcountry belonged to what historians Wallace Brown and Robert M. Calhoon define as clusters of “cultural minorities,” settlements of societal fringe groups that Calhoon specifically identifies as religious pacifists, white men who traded with the Indians, unassimilated ethnic minorities, and small farmers: “thousands of previously obscure men” caught during the subsequent American Revolution, “in the machinery of internal security.”<sup>68</sup> Robert V. Hine in his book on community on the frontier, appropriately subtitled “Separate but not Alone,” argues that, due to the inherently dangerous challenges on a frontier, the mainstream society demanded conformity and unity but the larger a minority community became, the longer it remained separate and the more it struggled internally, in peace or in war, to cling to its traditions under any set of circumstances. Isolation of communities bred free thinking, independence, and paranoia while encouraging disdain and suspicion among outsiders. Oppression of minority communities has a long tradition in American history, from the religious persecutions in early New England and Virginia to silencing dissent directed at popular wars in the Twentieth and Twenty-first centuries. In the South, the pro-Confederate majority took action against minority opposition communities in 1862-1865 by deeming such persons “Tories,” the Revolutionary War derogatory term for pro-British Americans. As with the American Revolution, the Tories of the Civil War found that oppression united very different groups of dissenters.<sup>69</sup>

Communities of such Loyalists, as rebels in their own right, would stand together to fight for the freedom to resist the tyranny of the majority of the backcountry’s population despite their internal ethnic, religious, and sometimes racial differences being as great as what separated them from the mainstream of frontier society. They sought to protect their personal freedom to choose to live differently and within their own culture, much as their countrymen in the



majority fought for self determination for the frontier as a whole. Colonial frontier social rebel, pamphleteer, and pacifist Herman Husband inspired and became a unifying thread between these socially besieged peoples on the North Carolina frontier. He had studied the political writings of Benjamin Franklin and the methods used in the resistance to the Stamp Act. Forgotten now, although as important in some circles as Thomas Paine, Husband made a great personal journey of self fulfillment went beyond leadership roles in the libertarian movements of the Regulator, American, and Whiskey rebellions to include a concurrent exploration of all religions he encountered. He became the spokesman, spiritual leader, and moral conscience of the North Carolina Regulators in the 1760s. His non violent role in that particular political dissention became so controversial that his North Carolina Quaker meeting disowned him. After that struggle failed, he fled the province for Pennsylvania.<sup>70</sup>

Within this resistance movement, historian Marjoleine Kars found a nucleus of discontent seeded among independent, highly moralistic, closed communities largely drawn from the Quakers and the Separatist or New Light Baptists. Both groups were active in the Raeburn Creek area and each had significant ties to Herman Husband's followers in North Carolina. Such congregations must have already appeared as heretical cults to mainstream old school Presbyterians like Andrew Pickens, a church elder, and to the other traditional American religions.

Although the Quakers, at the least, opposed all things military, some members could and did provide guides, information, and refuge for a cause such as the restoration of colonial rule. Raeburn Creek's Quakers of the Bush River Meeting included former members of Husband's Cane Creek Meeting such as the parents of James Lindley, a Loyalist later hanged after his capture at the battle of Kettle Creek. This meeting, however, existed so far outside of the Quaker

mainstream that it had unspecified difficulties in fulfilling the standards for recognition by the Yearly Meeting of Discipline for the South.<sup>71</sup>

Leaders like Husband had the power to motivate followers for a cause but especially within communities whose members already believed that they faced threats from the malevolent outside forces of the “world,” i.e. the practice of perceived evils by the greater population beyond their immediate settlement. Different ministers of the new highly emotional revision of the traditional Baptist religion inspired the faithful in much the same way in their respective congregations, and among black as well as white converts. This new faith, thus, would benefit and grow by becoming the common faith of all peoples on the frontier. Following the colonial militia’s dispersal of the North Carolina Regulators, its Baptists fled to Raeburn Creek and founded a church there. They likely contributed to what one visitor mentioned, without further explanation, as that congregation’s “peculiarities.” The South Carolina Regulator Rebellion had targeted as enemies to society an almost identical Separatist Baptist community on Fair Forest Creek that cohabited with Indians and whites who acted like Indians. A writer in the *Whig Gazette of the State of South Carolina* likely referred to such people when describing the later Kettle Creek Loyalists as deluded by Boyd and a number of persons who came among them from North Carolina on a variety of pretences. David Fanning of Raeburn Creek, the famed Loyalist partisan, would recruit whole regiments from Husband’s Regulators who had remained in North Carolina.<sup>72</sup>

Raeburn Creek became a center of Loyalist activity.<sup>73</sup> Moses Kirkland, architect of a plan to retake Georgia and South Carolina by a combined campaign of British regulars and Indians, lived there when he served as a major leader among the South Carolina Regulators. Prominent Loyalist Richard Pearis lived nearby. The Cunningham brothers, Robert and Patrick, well-

known to be among the king's friends, held leadership roles in this community, as did their cousin, the famous partisan William "Bloody Bill" Cunningham. On, or near, Raeburn Creek lived a James and a John Boyd, as well as Aquila Hall, James Lindley (father of Hall's son-in-law), Samuel Clegg (a likely relation to Boyd), and other important men later at the battle of Kettle Creek. The previously mentioned David Fanning led men from Raeburn Creek to aid the Cherokees in their frontier raids in 1776 and in attacks against the Whigs along the Savannah River in 1778. (He missed the Kettle Creek campaign, however, at that time he occupied himself with escaping from confinement in the jail at Ninety Six, South Carolina, where he had been confined as an enemy of the state.)<sup>74</sup>

Details about these people of Raeburn Creek document that they lived as a political culture outside of the mainstream, thereby a prime example of an insular colonial community that remained Loyalist. The residents included white men who lived as Indians and who were called "white savages" by the majority of frontiersmen who feared them more than anyone else. During the Snow Campaign, militia supporting the Revolution occupied this settlement. In a famous clash of arms, Whigs seized Loyalist James Lindley's fort on Raeburn Creek in July 1776 to try to prevent a Loyalist uprising. They then successfully held off a siege by eighty-eight Cherokees and 102 white men living as Indians and other Loyalists. Leaders in this settlement, like many of their followers, often had British nativity or, at the least, birth outside of the southern frontier. A British periodical described the men from whom the Kettle Creek Loyalists came as emigrants from the northern lands of England. Historian Robert Barnwell's noted that backcountry Loyalism, outside of militant Scots-Irishmen from Virginia, rested with Germans, Quakers, and recent immigrants. Boyd reportedly hailed from Ireland, as did William Cunningham and some of the other Raeburn Creek Loyalists. Thomas Rogers claimed to have been one of the some twenty men captured at Lindley's fort and nearly hanged for his role in

the same, also came from Ireland. Joseph Cartwright described Aquila Hall as “one Campbell,” likely a descriptive term for a Tory Lowland Scotsman. By contrast, Elijah Clarke in North Carolina, John Dooly in Virginia, Andrew Pickens in South Carolina, and many other rebel leaders had spent all, or almost all of their lives on the American frontier. (Many Whig leaders also hailed from Europe but few, if any, whole Whig communities consisted largely of European immigrants.)<sup>75</sup>

Oppressed Loyalists from settlements on Raeburn Creek, South Carolina, and from Tryon County, North Carolina, both of which had ties to the pacifist Husband’s spiritual and political leadership, bonded together when they heard and answered the king’s call. Although many of these men would be forced to abandon their homes to hide in the woods or to emigrate to East and West Florida, devoted Loyalists from other colonies such as Moses Watkins of Virginia would be drawn to there settlements after being forced to leave their homes. They would camp at Kettle Creek, Georgia, on February 14, 1779, en route to sympathizers in the nearby Wrightsborough, Georgia, community that also had ties to Husband. Joseph Maddock and other future leaders of that township had moved from what later became Delaware to Orange County, North Carolina, in the 1750s but they never completely assimilated into their new meeting. In a dispute over the disowning of a certain female member, later Wrightsborough leaders risked disownment by supporting Husband’s views in this matter; North Carolina Regulators met at Maddock’s mill.<sup>76</sup>

During those troubles, Maddock created the Wrightsborough community in far-off Georgia around his core following although this isolated meeting also drew members from many colonies. He named it for the settlement’s patron, royal governor James Wright. The Society of Friends (Quakers) had deep traditions of social and political activism that inspired

many of Thomas Paine's passages in his provocative *Common Sense* even though traditional Quaker principles of pacifism ruled out such extreme measures as revolution and violence in self defense.<sup>77</sup> Maddock, however, quietly allowed non Quakers to settle in his township and to erect a fort. Not having his faith's principles of non-violence and non-militarism, these other families from backcountry North Carolina provided armed defenders for the settlement. They included some of Husband's Regulators such as Isaac Jackson. Maddock thus created an exclusive ethnic pacifist community whose radical politics could influence a significantly larger, surrounding militant population, a situation that likely mirrored what also existed at Raeburn Creek, South Carolina, and in Tryon County, North Carolina.<sup>78</sup>

Aside from accepting the need for sympathetic armed neighbors, the Quakers of Wrightsborough did try to peacefully coexist with the nearby Creeks. Their three town squares had the names of Maddock, McGillivray, and Galphin. Lachlan McGillivray and George Galphin likely used their considerable influence to help Wrightsborough maintain peaceful relations with the Indians. These two British born white men made their fortunes by trading with the Indians and each had fathered mixed white/Creek children. (Galphin also sired children by white and slave women.) During the American Revolution, the pacifist George Galphin risked his property and his life to maintain the peace, contrary to the ambitions of some Georgians, as an Indian commissioner for the Continental Congress. South Carolinians remembered that he, like bandit Joseph Coffel and later bandit Daniel McGirth, had been a "moderator," one of the backcountry leaders who sought compromise during their Regulator struggles. False rumors survived for generations that he and his racially diverse sons became blood thirsty Loyalist bandits.<sup>79</sup> People of the backcountry of lesser means who feared Indian attack must have looked askance at both the pacifist Galphin's lifestyle and at his extensive and thriving entrepreneurial speculations in frontier land, timber, livestock, and slavery, as well as

his trade with the Indians; and his and McGillivray's township of emigrants from their Northern Ireland. He must have appeared to be trying to take over and remake the southern frontier into his own agricultural corporation with his children of various races as the middle management and on his principles of pacifism and racial harmony. McGillivray's mixed-blood son Alexander worked as an agent for the British and would become the great leader of the Creek nation. White Indian fighting frontiersmen must have held as suspect, by association, the Wrightsborough Quakers for their very public acknowledgement of such prominent white men who traded with the Indians and who openly cohabited with non-whites.<sup>80</sup>

The communities of Friends, along with the Separatist or "New Light" Baptists, became centers of controversy on race in another way. With a prohibition on owning human beings, the followers of these faiths must have been a radical minority anywhere on the frontier.

Wrightsborough always prohibited that institution among its Meeting's members and the Bush River (Raeburn Creek) Quaker Meeting purged its membership of anyone who failed to free his or her slaves. The new Baptist faith largely sought out and welcomed African-American members. By the time of the American Civil War, minorities within the Baptists would be almost the only voices in the South that dared to call for an end to slavery.<sup>81</sup>

Mainstream colonial frontiersmen, however, saw human bondage as such a means of economic advancement that militiamen wanted captured African-Americans and Indians treated as spoils of war. Up-and-coming men of means, and slave owners, like Andrew Pickens and John Dooly, had little fear of abolitionists, although groups to end slavery in the colonies existed in Great Britain by the 1760s and a London court accepted arguments in the 1772 Somerset case that slaves had the legal right to unobstructed self-emancipation. Americans recognized the potential for this decision in the British colonies. Slave owners must have had

concerns about the threat to slavery by opposition groups for by the time of the American Revolution, the frontier had some 6,000 bondsmen. Minority communities on the frontier also became notorious for protecting runaway slaves but especially in settlements with members of mixed races.<sup>82</sup>

Another settlement on Georgia's border with the Indians gained a similar reputation for combining different elements as a Loyalist center and as a refuge for McGirth's mixed race bandit gang. It too supported opposition to slavery in conflict with prevailing colonial society of the South. America's pre-war religious enthusiasm had largely excluded emancipation but, as with society as a whole, fringe elements like some of the Quaker communities had proven exceptional. Matthew Moore, likely a member of the Scots-Irish Queensborough Township created by Galphin and McGillivray, founded one of Georgia's first Separatist Baptist congregations on Big Buckhead Creek in today's Burke and Jenkins counties. Later a Loyalist who died during the war, Moore rallied his congregation for the king's cause behind the leadership of Henry Sharp, his brother-in-law and a deacon in his church. Sharp clashed with Georgia's officials almost continuously since he arrived in the colony from Virginia in the 1760s. His struggles went beyond the period of the American Revolution. Colonial juries found him guilty of various violations of the colony's civil law. For trading with the Indians without a license, he and his partners were driven through the streets of Savannah while taking a lashing. received a public lashing. Despite routinely conveying hundreds of acres of land to almost anyone else for little more than the asking, Governor Wright and his council turned down all of Sharp's requests for land grants, likely because of his reputation as a trouble maker.<sup>83</sup>

After 1775, when the majority of the population joined the Revolution, Sharp continued resistance against his society in general, a traditional practice in socially radical Georgia. In 1777, Moore persuaded Sharp to emancipate George Liele to minister to black Baptists. The

congregation had been so inspired by this slave's preaching that they had ordained him. As the first black Baptist minister, and with the support of George Galphin, Liele would go on to form at least two congregations on the Savannah River and would mentor David George, the later religious leader of the Sierra Leone resettlement of Africans. Georgia law, reflecting the fear of violent slave revolts, prohibited such assemblages. Rebel authorities, most likely due to his emancipation of Liele, regarded Sharp as a danger and had him imprisoned on a ship to prevent his release by court order or by his congregation. Free at the time of or because of Campbell's capture of Savannah, he led a successful guerilla war against the Whigs until he suffered a mortal wound on March 30, 1779 in a battle that also took the life of Major John Spurgeon of South Carolina, the man who had tried unsuccessfully to rally the Loyalists during the battle of Kettle Creek.<sup>84</sup>

It would hardly surprise students of the American Civil War (1861-1876) and the modern Civil Rights struggles (1954-1968) that the American Revolution in the South involved conflict between communities over race, religion, and foreign nativity. The New World has an unbroken tradition of using racial conflict as an excuse for class warfare just as the Old World has done just the opposite.<sup>85</sup> As but one of many examples, the above Rev. Mathew Moore who ordained the first African American Baptist minister and the pacifist George Galphin who supported Liele's ministry both claimed Northern Ireland nativity. They represented a greater tradition of European immigrants transplanting ideals in America often otherwise absent in practice on both sides of the Atlantic. Baptists, as explained earlier, reached out across political and racial lines. Ministers of this faith would come to represent the most significant leadership in opposition to slavery and to the Confederate States of America, in the slave states, in 1861-1865. All three of the most divisive wars in the United States would become inseparable from



these same social problems because the wars exposed contradictions between worst realities in the nation's society and the widely proclaimed ideals of its great rebellion so famously expressed in its Declaration of Independence, a document that highlights these impasses by also being the great starting point of propaganda against loyal Americans. The equality of all men and of all Americans proclaimed by Thomas Paine, Thomas Jefferson, and other founding fathers in such immortalized writings often failed to include toleration of minorities of popular opinion from before, during, or after the Revolution. Many of those Loyalists suffered and died for practicing those principles and at the hands of Patriot neighbors who would claim to be fighting for those same rights as denied to them by Great Britain.<sup>86</sup>

The fact that Loyalist communities often consisted of immigrant families of significantly different religions and/or attitudes than the much greater numbers of their American born neighbors aided in this "Americanization" of the Revolution by changing the war from just being against a foreign occupation to adding resident alien collaborators as enemies of the state. Contempt for foreign born persons and religious prejudice then became a powerful tool to gain support for the revolution in the backcountry by making already suspect minority communities that failed to support the rebellion its victims. The Highland Scots of North Carolina, for example, had been largely royalists in Europe and their American neighbors generally viewed them with suspicion. With the coming of the Revolution, this mistrust evolved into a violent civil war that culminated in the Whig victory over 1,400 Highlanders and 200 former North Carolina Regulators at the Battle of Moore's Creek Bridge, North Carolina, on February 27, 1776.<sup>87</sup> The German community of the Broad and Saluda fork in South Carolina also remained predominately Loyalist. Historian Peter N. Moore has written about nearby immigrant poor, ethnically distinct, non-slave holding Loyalists in the Waxhaws community in the Catawba Valley, on the border between North and South Carolina. This Scots-Irish "Blackjack"

settlement found itself “suspect, excluded, and vulnerable.” It suffered abuse from mainstream neighbors who “crushed dissent and heightened fear and hatred of difference.” Like the Irish communities, some of the Germans, the Quakers, and the escaped slaves, the members of this settlement had been victims of lack of toleration elsewhere, at least as individuals, before seeking freedom and liberty on the British colonial frontier. They felt, like many members of the Wrightsborough community, compelled to go to the British army for protection and likely some of them did so by following Boyd in 1779.<sup>88</sup>

## V

During the American Revolution, members of the Loyalists found themselves regarded as common criminals, or relegated to a worse status, rather than as prisoners of conscience. George Washington, later credited for his personal sacrifices that guaranteed a united nation, demanded at Yorktown that the Loyalists be surrendered to civil authorities for prosecution rather than to allow them to receive the status of prisoners of war.<sup>89</sup> At least seven men went to the gallows for their participation in the battle of Kettle Creek. Southern rebels, however, claimed that they only punished men for civil crimes committed before the war. James Cannon, a guard of the South Carolinians taken at Kettle Creek, stated that in the end his superiors only hanged the most violent offenders, including James Lindley, Samuel Clegg, and John “Rogue” Anderson. The latter may have been a notorious pre Revolutionary War thief. Aquila Hall, another of the men executed, went to the gallows specifically on the charge of his having committed a murder in North Carolina.<sup>90</sup> He allegedly acknowledged the justice of his sentence while on the gallows.<sup>91</sup>

Loyalists defined as “criminals” credibly fit historian Crane Briton’s definition of victims of “dual sovereignty.” Each side, by claiming governmental legitimacy, could then define the

actions of the other as crimes against public law and against humanity. The British first made that distinction with the arrest of Ebenezer Smith Platt, a Georgia civilian, for sedition early in the war. Under the authority of government, for example, any American could condone, as legal impressments, what his neighbors condemned as pillaging. Raeburn Creek's Loyalists included active members of both North and South Carolina's Regulator rebellions, men from communities that already had seen resistance to corrupt civil authority or, at best, a provincial government that ignored brigands, as a moral and a religious cause above and beyond opposition to an unjust system. Violation of state laws that worked against traditional royal authority would thus hardly appear as criminal acts to persons openly loyal to what had been established British colonial rule of law. Escaped slaves, "white savages," and other persons could also see what others defined as "lawlessness" as a necessity and excusable self-defense from an unjust society.<sup>92</sup>

The general population could identify enough "Tories" with men of dubious reputations and motivations to impute the reputation of anyone who supported the British. Frontiersmen in the upcountry Welsh Tract community of South Carolina, for example, had continuously petitioned the colonial government to take action against mixed racial, property less families among their midst beginning at least as early as 1739. Following the opening of the new lands after the Cherokee War of 1759, South Carolina's backcountry had become a magnet for such men who lived on society's fringes and outside of any law. Southerners had, for years, been labeling frontier bandits as "Scoffelites," after Joseph Coffel (or Scovel), a notorious rustler, chicken thief, and militia colonel who had opposed the South Carolina Regulators. (Patriot William Moultrie described him as a stupid, ignorant, noisy, blockhead.) Friend and foe came to apply that term to all South Carolina Loyalists, as well as to white men who lived as if they were Indians and to the self-emancipated African-Americans. In 1778, some 350 frontiersmen,

reportedly drawn from remnants of French-German Palatine settlers in South Carolina and referred to as “Scoffelites,” marched to British East Florida, taking horses and whatever else they needed from farms and collecting recruits along their route. The first published history of the Kettle Creek campaign, although by a British source, made a similar observation about some of the Loyalists who followed Boyd:

The most hardy and desperate of these people, had long been in the condition of outlaws, and had attached themselves to the Indians, and others of their own description, in the incursions on the frontiers . . . From these circumstances, and from the cast of mind and of manners described acquired by their constant intercourse, whether as friends or as enemies, with the savages, they were ever ready to take up arms; and many of those, who continued in the occupation of their farms, and assumed the character of living peacefully at home, occasionally joined the parties which were openly in arms on the frontiers, and bore a share in all the deviation they committed.”<sup>93</sup>

During the Revolution, members of the colonial elite commanded men popularly seen as society’s dregs because too few other men would enlist in the king’s service. English born gentleman Thomas Brown, for example, one of the pre-war up-and-coming men on the frontier, recruited a battalion of young men from Georgia and South Carolina that he freely admitted had close associations with the white frontiersmen’s traditional Indian enemies and some of whom had been identified as Scoffelites. Even British officers called Brown’s men bandits. An American and member of a prominent Whig family, Loyalist Daniel McGirth led a mixed band of white, Indian, and black raiders who used rape as a weapon of terror. With an extensive organization that crossed political boundaries, he used voter fraud and manipulated the legal situation to pioneer true organized crime in America. In the last days of the Revolution, Georgia’s restored colonial government would call on McGirth for help when no one else would come to its defense. He then used his new commission to further perpetuate his well known robberies and violence to damaging the little respect it had left.<sup>94</sup> During the American

Revolution, such men as Daniel McGirth could try to use the status of pro British partisans or the war as a whole as a cover for criminal activities. Frontiersmen could understand punishing such people as felons rather than as political dissenters. Claims of the king's men seizing horses, arms, supplies, and prominent frontier Whig leaders, as in the Kettle Creek campaign, compelled many men to join the militia under Pickens and Dooly in order to protect themselves or their personal property beyond any social, political, or military obligations. Many British officers did want to use the Loyalists and Indians as instruments of terror and enforced submission, all the more so when the majority of Americans already held these people under suspicion and in contempt. British Major Patrick Ferguson suggested offering a confiscated rebel farm to every man who would join in such a campaign as a means of luring to the king's cause property less European emigrants who made up so much of the Whig's professional military.<sup>95</sup>

The Whigs, while calling the Loyalists criminals and traitors, hypocritically excused any of their own questionable actions in the rebellion as necessary self defense against the invading and occupying British army and later against "traitorous" Tory bandits. They used this excuse as they opposed the king's laws with which they had all once been proud to have identified themselves as dutiful subjects. The rebels also actively recruited troops of young frontiersmen without property, popularly called "Crackers," who survived by stealing cattle and hunting deer. Although lacking discipline, by being single and having nothing to protect, they had little reason to desert or to fear retribution for their acts of violence and robbery. Mylne, Woodmason, Harvey, Milfort, and other observers would have described the illiterate semi-nomadic herdsmen/hunters who made up the general male population of the American frontier with those same words, before and after the war. Aside from such elsewhere "notorious" founding fathers as John Hancock, Baron Von Steuben, and John Paul Jones, descendants of the Patriots

have come at times to remember such wholesale killers as Robert Sallett and the “white savage” Patrick Carr; and such plunderers as former Wrightsborough Quaker Josiah Dunn, Thomas Sumter, Francis Marion, and George Dooly (John's brother) as heroes. While John Dooly and his men risked their lives fighting for the Revolution against Loyalists at the battle of Kettle Creek, Whig horsemen under Leonard Marbury robbed the families of some of those same Georgia militiamen for having, days earlier, taken an oath of allegiance to the king while under duress.<sup>96</sup>

Racial prejudice, while being used as a weapon to draw up popular support against the Loyalists went ignored by the Whigs with regards to their own men. Thomas Sumter, for example, once lived as an Indian and he spoke fluent Cherokee. Dempsey Tyner, an Indian, African-American, dark skinned Caucasian, or of some mixed racial identity, and likely a relation to Loyalist agent Harris Tyner, served under Pickens repeatedly as a scout and spy, against Indians and at the battle of Kettle Creek. (Dempsey would also serve at the battle of King's Mountain as a member of the conscripted Loyalist militia.) The slave Austin Dabney would earn emancipation for his services fighting under Elijah Clarke in Augusta in 1781 or 1782.<sup>97</sup>

The best and worst of both sides of Americans being so akin highlights that this civil war within the Revolutionary War went beyond issues of individuals to greater movements between competitive communities; the more powerful and numerous came to seek political independence from Great Britain and the minorities sought to retain the king's protection of their own freedom to be different. Rachel N. Klein, William H. Nelson, and others historians argue against using such issues as race, reputation, ideology, class, background, and economics to categorize political motivations *of the individual* (emphasis mine), especially as the fortunes

of war pushed many people, often reluctantly, into one camp or the other.<sup>98</sup> Modern sociologist Daniel J. Levinson wrote, however, that refusing to participate in the “patriotism” of the majority makes already existing “out groups” more ethnocentric and more anathema to the general public. A cycle begins that makes each side less compromising to the point that the majority must, in his words, “liquidate” the minority to prevent an undermining of the greater group’s increasing, according to Sociologist Arnold Mindell, unquestioned unity of purpose. (Within closed minority groups dissention also steadily disappears in times of crisis.) Levinson described “liquidation” as subordinating and segregating but, in a civil war, it could also mean the worst of what has come to be termed “ethnic cleansing.” In the American Revolution, as with the South during Reconstruction (1865-1876), and so many later conflicts, the resident opposition majority recognized that the enemy occupation forces, however powerful, have to fail if their local support disappears by means of intimidation. Animosity towards the “king’s men” grew to where men who failed to join in the oppression of their Loyalist neighbors could themselves become suspect to and victims of the mainstream. Historian Robert M. Weir wrote that the Regulator Rebellion brought home to South Carolinians that those leaders who failed to act against the perceived public enemy risked losing authority. Similarly, Whig leaders who tried to end the atrocities against the Loyalists, or tried to defend them, compromised their respect and control. They could be regarded as the enemy. Whatever reasons motivated the initial violence, retaliation followed and later still more revenge, giving all groups greater motivation to act without restraint or humanity. Historian Michael Stephenson has pointed out that colonial wars especially inspire such suppression and the executions of collaborators by their neighbors in the resistance. British historian Richard Holmes referred to the civil war element of the American Revolution as a society sinking into “fanaticarchy.”<sup>99</sup> By the end of the Revolution, partisan murder did become so common in the Deep South that cynics called

the killing of unarmed prisoners, usually men who dared to openly support the king's cause, as releasing the victim through the granting of a "Georgia parole." Elsewhere, this crime came to be called "lynching" from the executions of Loyalists by Col. Charles Lynch of Virginia.<sup>100</sup> Rule of law ceased to exist in many such places and would not be fully restored to that state in particular until years after the Revolution.<sup>101</sup> Whig leaders like Andrew Pickens and Tarleton Brown also refused to forgive the Loyalists for being the cause if unintended, of the British invasions and the resulting years of conflict. Men such as Andrew Jackson would go so far as to blame the Tories, rather than circumstances of disease, heat stroke, or anything else, as responsible for the deaths of his family members during the war. Even Americans who had preferred a return to colonial rule came to blame the presence of the king's army for inciting violence against them and their families. During the last years of the war, Brown and men like him persecuted the king's followers to the point of meeting today's definition of "genocide."<sup>102</sup>

Many Loyalists, however, wanted to live, remain in America, and save their property from theft by partisans or state confiscation. When they acted accordingly, they became something of a living eulogy for British aspirations in what had been the thirteen colonies. Their numbers included such men as the local leaders who met with Boyd at Wrightsborough in January 1779 but who ended the war actually claiming land bounties as Whig refugees who had served in other states or under the category of citizens who had peacefully remained as politically neutral in Georgia after August 20, 1781. A suspicious similarity exists between the names of men on the rosters of Thomas Brown's Loyalist King's Carolina Rangers and some of the recipients of these land certificates for Revolutionary War service, or at least neutrality, including those certified by their frequent foe during the war, Elijah Clarke. (Two-thirds of the



men who received bounty land grants in Georgia did so only as such citizens.) William Lee returned to Georgia and became an elected local official in Augusta.<sup>103</sup>

Many dedicated Loyalists did remain in or returned to America. Claims for property losses filed with the British government after the war provide biographical information on some of those men. Jonas Bedford, for example, a New Jersey son of English born parents, had been wounded thirteen times as a militia officer in the French and Indian wars in the 1750s. He had helped to raise a company to suppress the North Carolina Regulators in the 1760s and he subsequently received colonial commissions as a militia officer and a justice of the peace. Refusing to take any active role in the war until 1780, when threats from bandits to burn his home caused him to abandon his wife and eight children, Bedford then joined the Loyalists at King's Mountain, just before the battle, as a private and later served in John Moore's (of Kettle Creek fame) troop and in Thomas Brown's King's Carolina Rangers. He narrowly escaped execution by vengeful Whigs during the war and would flee to Georgia, East Florida, and England. Nonetheless, in 1823 he died peacefully as a free man of property back at his home in backcountry North Carolina.<sup>104</sup> The notorious South Carolina Tory raider Daniel McGirth also found ways to remain in Georgia after the war, usually as a free man and a felon, until his death in 1804. Prominent North Carolina Loyalist Colonel John Hamilton lived in Norfolk, Virginia, as a British consul from 1790 until the opening of the War of 1812. His past house guests included such important Americans such as Stephen Decatur and, likely as at least an acquaintance, his former nemesis in the Kettle Creek campaign, then Congressman Andrew Pickens. One Loyalist community that remained in Abbeville District, South Carolina, after the war founded the "New Britain" community on Indian lands in Tennessee in 1806. Despite their community's past, they were led by a man named George Washington Morgan.<sup>105</sup>

Such children of dissent and revolution succeeded so well at staying in the United States that they and their descendants helped in major ways to create the new country. The heritage of some of the communities that survived the American Revolution to, or almost to, the present day from places that still bear such ethnic American names as “Irish Buffalo Creek” and “Dutch Buffalo Creek” can be heard in varied accents spoken in Raleigh, the state capital of North Carolina that grew up on the frontier. Ironically, those people in the “old North State” have produced an exceptional number of the greatest voices of a country whose creation their ancestors had once opposed. George Stephenson, prominent North Carolina research authority, has written of the Loyalists of Moore’s Creek, Rayburn Creek, Kettle Creek, and so many other landmarks of the southern backcountry:

The two-centuries-old wound inflicted on the body social by the struggle between Tory and Patriot during the American Revolution appears to be healing at long last. Researchers with American ancestors who were loyal to the British Crown when practically everybody else’s were struggling for independence no longer blush, grin guiltily, or bite their lower lip when confessing publically to the fact.<sup>106</sup>

Descendants of such families, however, often still try to prove that these Revolutionary War ancestors were rebels and Patriots, and often with convoluted excuses for actions by people they never knew centuries ago. These forbearers actually do count as both, in a broader, but more accurate sense, by choosing to remain as loyal subjects to King George III until they reluctantly abandoned that cause in order to survive and to remain in America to build the modern United States in a process that Dr. Robert Calhoon has termed as “moderation.”<sup>107</sup>

## VI

Americans who had been denied the liberty to refuse to commit treason against their lawful monarch did commit a form of social and political rebellion against the new United

States. They left their homes on Raeburn Creek, South Carolina, and in Tryon County, North Carolina, to join the British army in Georgia in early 1779. In making this effort, they demonstrated the strengths and weaknesses of determined but diverse minority communities working together in rebellion against the majority frontier society.

Their journey actually began in 1778. That year Robert Cunningham, a leader of the Raeburn Creek community, reported to Thomas Brown that thousands of men in South Carolina were prepared to march to British East Florida and had stockpiled two years of corn for such a journey. Brown, a prominent English born planter and now commanding a Loyalist provincial battalion, had been tortured in Augusta, Georgia, for rallying support against the rebellion in 1775. He subsequently moved to St. Augustine. Now he sent his agents John York and Harris Tyner into the backcountry to bring these thousands of men to the defense of East Florida. York has been described as a white man who lived as an Indian and Tyner counted as a “free person of color,” i.e. being of mixed European, Indian, and/or African blood. When the rebellion cut off American trade with any British possession, troops from East Florida launched repeated cattle rustling raids to feed a population that had swelled from the addition of 7,000 refugees from Georgia and the Carolinas. The Whigs responded with counter raids and invasions of their own that were encouraged by reports of support in province for the Revolution. Anti Loyalist legislation in all of the Deep South’s new state governments further pressured at least politically neutral frontiersmen to answer Brown’s call as a minimal means of finding a place of refuge that might remain in the British Empire if the United States won its independence. Partisan fighter David Fanning of Raeburn Creek first joined a group of men led by John York at Raeburn Creek and then another with Colonel Ambrose Mills from the Tryon County area of North Carolina but both groups turned back in the face of Whig opposition. Another group of these backcountry Loyalists, some 350 men under John Murphy and

Benjamin Gregory, succeeded in reaching East Florida in April 1778. Friend and foe alike called them Scoffelites, after a notorious South Carolina thief who likely had died years earlier. Along their route they lived off the land as bandits. The king's forces rescued them from an island and swamp where they had sought refuge from the rebels for a week. An observer noted upon their arrival that they rode good horses, wore red bands in their hats as identification, and each carried a rifle. Initially they served under Lieutenant Colonel Jacques Marcus Prévost, a Swiss officer in the British army and brother of General Prévost. Three hundred and twenty-eight of their number gave up their rags and moccasins for uniforms of green riding waistcoats trimmed in black and other more formal attire. They became a professionally drilled provincial unit of two forty-man troops of rifle dragoons and four forty-five-man companies of infantry armed with a combination of rifles and Brown Bess muskets. As the South Carolina Royalists, they were then placed under the command of their former neighbors Lieutenant Colonel Joseph Robinson and Major Evan McLaurin. The latter, a Scottish born frontier merchant who had been serving as a quartermaster in East Florida, had made secret return trips to the backcountry for the British.

Men like Aquila Hall of Raeburn Creek (he became an ensign in the new unit) might have joined the military in hopes of, if captured, being treated as a prisoner of war instead being prosecuted for past criminal acts. They found themselves starving with the rest of the colony's growing and increasingly hungry population. Many of them now talked of deserting and returning home to South Carolina to take their chances with their neighbors. Some of their number did desert to the enemy army that summer.<sup>108</sup>

Boyd, whether James or John, likely represented men guilty of hardly more than refusing to join in a rebellion fostered by people who already held them in deep suspicion and had been

their oppressors.<sup>109</sup> He has been said to have been an Irishman and from the Lower Yadkin Valley of North Carolina.<sup>110</sup> A newspaper account stated that he came among the people of isolated, insular Loyalist communities like Raeburn Creek, South Carolina, but land grant and other records suggest that he also lived there. He likely had been one of the North Carolina Regulators who moved to that Baptist and Quaker settlement on the South Carolina backcountry following the failure of Herman Husband's colonial rebellion. Instead of joining the provincials in East Florida, he must have left St. Augustine to find help for the Loyalist settlements in the Carolina backcountry in late 1778. This Loyalist leader traveled to British occupied New York, a city whose capture the king's ministers had once believed would somehow win the war for them. By late 1778, it had become virtually the only safe area left for the king's soldiers, civilians, and refugees in the thirteen former colonies but its environment had steadily deteriorated from being besieged, undersupplied, and overcrowded. There Boyd found support for taking the war to the South if only because the military and civilians had become despondent for any other means of victory. By being in the right place at the right moment, he became the critical element in implementing a campaign to use a British invasion to spark a civilian uprising coincided with the plan for an invasion of Georgia that William Knox had urged upon Lord George Germain, Secretary of State for America, in London.<sup>111</sup>

Returning to the South with Campbell's successful invasion force and likely among the Loyalists who traveled on the ship owned by Loyalist John Hamilton, Boyd only left the British army at Savannah on or after January 10, 1779. By then, Campbell's force had been reinforced by troops from East Florida under General Augustin Prévost. Ensign Aquila Hall accompanied them and now joined the mission to reach the Loyalists in the backcountry. Within days and likely with the help of men from McGirth's bandits and Sharp's Big Buckhead community, Boyd proceeded as far as the quasi Quaker community Wrightsborough where he held a

meeting on January 24 with Joseph Maddock and other prominent members of that settlement. He sought guides to safely lead him to the South Carolina frontier. They all likely knew one another from having attended meetings almost a decade before at Maddock's Mill in North Carolina in support of Herman Husband and his North Carolina Regulator movement. Shortly after and back in South Carolina, Boyd almost certainly used the services of "white Indians" and other frontiersmen from Thomas Brown's rangers to take him on the last leg of his journey, back to his home back at Raeburn Creek. Sympathetic and influential neighbors, including William "Bloody Bill" Cunningham, Thomas Fletchall, Zachariah Gibbes, Christopher Neally, and John Spurgeon helped him gather men to march to Georgia. He reached further, likely through his community's connections to Herman Husband and his North Carolina Regulators, so that he finally began his march with some 700 men, including 250 to 350 North Carolinians under John Moore and Nicholas Welsh. Aquila Hall traveled to Tryon, North Carolina, where he threatened to lynch Lieutenant Andrew Deveny if he told of the Loyalist conspiracy. Deveny, instead, warned Col. Joseph McDowell and Col. Andrew Hampton soon had a party in pursuit of the Loyalists.

With drums beating, fifes playing, and flags waving, the men of this hastily-formed regiment secured isolated outposts such as Fort Independence (Robert Anderson's home) and the station at Broadmouth Creek. At these places, arms, horses, and supplies had been stockpiled in case of Indian attack and the small garrisons would have mistaken any approaching column of mounted white men as friends coming to their aid. The Loyalists seized personal property that they needed, while capturing enemy leaders along the South Carolina Indian frontier, as they hastily moved south. In all of these actions, they could claim that they acted legally on behalf of their legal sovereign. Having obtained enough men to have filled the

requirements of an open commission as a colonel in the provincials, like that one given by Campbell to John Hamilton, Boyd had in only a matter of days and with hardly more than a proclamation put together a regiment of men from diverse communities for the king's cause and marched them through hundreds of miles of territory made hostile by Whigs and by people who, beyond any politics, regarded Boyd and his followers as dangerous men and bandits.<sup>112</sup>

Independent settlements of societal malcontents on a sparsely settled frontier could quickly organize a regiment since they were used to defending themselves from Indians, bandits, Regulators, or Whigs. They should have had greater problems coming together that quickly in a time and place when communications traveled only as fast as a horse. When South Carolina governor John Rutledge, for example, issued a proclamation declaring John Boyd, John Spurgeon, and their followers as enemies of the state that action would happen months after the Loyalists had reached Kettle Creek. The first published history of the Kettle Creek campaign explained how they came together: "The nature and remoteness of the country, afforded them an opportunity of keeping up a free intercourse with their old friends, neighbors, and fellow sufferers in the same cause, who still continuing at home, had apparently submitted to the present government. This circumstance necessarily served to nourish and strengthen that disposition and spirit which we have described."<sup>113</sup> These isolated communities of ethnic minorities, threatened by their majority neighbors, heard the calling of their spiritual leaders. They overcame their differences to act with a selfless dogmatic dedication that modern sociologists define as the action of "cults." Because they came from very different isolated communities, however, their members formed a fragile, limited, and not necessarily militant coalition.

Boyd's success had to have depended upon such networked communities of men, if from different backgrounds, ready to follow an inspiring man of their own beliefs. To identify

him as the “leader,” however misses the point. Men like him—and Clarke, Dooly, and Pickens on the other side—become the creation of their followers as a channeling of the group’s most important but often unrealistic expectations into someone who appears almost as their Messiah. He actually only became a reflection of their own aspirations, delusions, prejudices, and misinformation. His men essentially followed their own shadow. Historian Crane Brinton wrote that such groups recruit men like Boyd, Nat Turner, and John Brown from otherwise realistic, practical members whom the community inspires, conversely, to lead them in grand but delusional fatalistic schemes; they become “unfettered by common sense” while they gain “enough of the prophet’s fire to hold followers.” Brinton summed up such leaders as transformed by their closed groups into persons more determined, dedicated, reckless, and fanatical than the members of the community as a whole, as “Machiavellians in the service of the Beautiful and the Good.”<sup>114</sup>

The success and failure of Boyd matches Brinton’s model. Almost nothing credible about his background, including his given name, survives. Any prominence he had must have been confined to within his own closed community. As a resident of the Raeburn Creek settlement, “there great Colo. Boyd,” as Dooly described him, may still have been a previous acquaintance of Andrew Pickens (they may both have been Presbyterians) and possibly of John Dooly but his one moment of importance came when he convinced—and became convinced by—his like minded neighbors to leave their families to make a perilous journey in a desperate effort to try to rendezvous with the British army. His belief in their cause became a legend through his alleged final words wherein he blamed the failure of his mission only upon his being mortally wounded early in the battle. He proudly proclaimed that he died for his king and his country. Whatever his religious background, he wanted none of the devout Presbyterian Andrew



Pickens' "damned rebel" prayers. When the colonel later reportedly confronted Boyd's widow with news of her husband's death and to give return her husband's watch and other personal belongings, she allegedly angrily refuted the claim as a rebel lie.<sup>115</sup>

If the widow made such a retort, she spoke for her entire community as much as for her late husband. On the frontier, observers such as Charles Woodmason, William Mylne, and Louis Milfort described the women as an industrious base of settlement while their husbands lived like wild vagabonds. Although the men officially owned the land, the real "small farmers" had to have been their wives and children. The difference between land owning herdsmen and the landless men on the frontier who lived by hunting and stealing had more to do with legal technicality than cultural differences.<sup>116</sup>

The women had to have had political commitment as strong as their men and, as the basis of the community, must have been as important. The occurrence of wives and children being left behind and keeping the communities alive had deep roots. Frontiersmen, like the famous Daniel Boone of North Carolina and Kentucky would abandon their often large families for years at a time, before the Revolution. Colonial Americans, as reflected in the claims filed by Loyalists and the requests for pensions by widows of Whigs, such as Margaret Strozier of Kettle Creek, had the pre-Victorian attitude of land and business as the realm of the husband and while the household goods belonged to the wife, in life and in law. Each side believed, often mistakenly, that while the soldiers of the other camp might execute or imprison men, the enemy avoided harming non-combatants and might leave alone property that supported the basis of any community, its women and children. A visitor to the Ninety Six District of the South Carolina immediately after the war reported the area having 1,200 widows created by the fighting.<sup>117</sup>

While the dedication of such men and women can remain literally to the end, the commitment among average members evaporates the farther they travel from their enclosed group with its lack of dissenting voices, the more they were forced to confront reality.<sup>118</sup> The North Carolinians under John Moore that set out to join Boyd illustrated this problem early in the march. They tried to raid the house of Whig Colonel John Thomas. One young man, together with a household of women and small children, drove them off. Boyd's combined force failed to cross the Savannah River at Cherokee Ford when a Whig lieutenant with only a handful of men, a swivel gun, a blockhouse, and sheer bluff obstructed their passage. The Loyalists then had to cross the river into Georgia on rafts at the mouth of Vann's Creek [today's Van Creek]. A small force of militia suffered a severe defeat while challenging that crossing. Thirteen of these Whigs, including two captains, were captured; their defeat likely owed more to the jungle in which the fight took place rather than the military prowess of their enemy. Boyd allegedly claimed that he had some 100 casualties in this skirmish but whatever men he lost, the greatest number likely consisted of men who had come to have serious doubts about this venture and used the confusion to slip away and return home. He still had an advantage in that most of his Whig neighbors who would have successfully stopped him had marched to the Savannah River opposite Augusta, in order to block any attempt by the British troops there to enter the backcountry. With his superior numbers in tact, he should have been able to march quickly and successfully through any remaining opposition to Augusta but delays and detours at Cherokee Ford and Vann's Creek exposed the fragility of the unity of his "regiment" and guaranteed they would, at the least, arrive too late to achieve their goal.<sup>119</sup>

The events of this uprising told and foretold much. The men who followed Boyd, voluntarily or under threats from men like Aquila Hall, must have noticed that at almost every

step of their march armed frontier Americans, sometimes by the dozens rose up to try to stop them against the odds as if pursuing a hostile Indian war party. The moment of truth about this uprising and the true nature of their support for the king's cause came to a head at swampy Kettle Creek on the morning of February 14, 1779. Boyd made his headquarters in a cowpen on or adjoining a narrow, highly defensible, hilltop on the north and east side of a bend in the creek, where the path to Wrightsborough passed. This Tory leader who had traveled thousands of miles and faced enumerable obstacles spent that last morning getting his prisoners and most of his men and horses across the flooded channels of the cane-choked creek. He allowed his dissidents to leave and he ordered the spare horses released. With the last of his followers, he waited atop today's War Hill as the last of his men butchered a cow. They would have to join their comrades camped across the creek before marching on to find succor from the sympathetic settlers in Wrightsborough and then travel on to the British troops whom they still believed waited for them one day away. (Campbell had given up on Boyd by then and had withdrawn with his troops from Augusta only hours before.) Captain John Hamilton may have arrived with his horsemen as reinforcements. The Loyalists knew that various groups of militiamen had pursued them since they had begun their march but they apparently had ceased to care. They had skirmished with Pickens' men the evening before but from where they now camped they must have had ample reasons to hope for success.<sup>120</sup>

This moment had significance beyond anything that the men in the coming battle might have appreciated. A frontier "cowpens" stood at the battlefield site, one of the many facts about this campaign of at least symbolic importance. More than merely a split rail pen, it usually included cabins, riflemen armed to hunt game, and crops, surrounded by a broad meadow that made any assault a dangerous proposition. It served as a small farm with the qualities of a fort. Andrew Pickens, in the first battle fought in South Carolina during the American Revolution,

had helped to successfully use such a compound as a defensive position at Ninety Six against the Loyalists in 1775. As a backcountry settlement consisted of only a few buildings, at best, such places could also take on special importance during the American Revolution beyond any military value. These enclosures could find a use as a makeshift prison, as they would for the men captured at or arrested because of the battle of Kettle Creek. The Burke County jail, a similar isolated log building or buildings on the Georgia frontier, and the tiny village of Ninety Six in South Carolina provide classic examples of perceived political control through occupation of symbols of government. These places hardly existed as more than names on a maps but both sides expended considerable effort to “hold” these locations that lacked almost any other significance, much as police stations serve the same end in modern Third World insurgencies. Some cowpens, in the years after the war, would evolve into towns, such as George Galphin’s famous colonial ranch that became Louisville, an early state capitol of Georgia. It became a symbol of the history, progress, and potential of the frontier as it would pass into the more settled world that followed.<sup>121</sup>

Rifles used that day at the battle of Kettle Creek have also been unappreciated as the symbols and tools of change on the frontier. Revolutionaries traditionally need weapons “of the people” that can counter the well equipped and trained military of their enemy. An effective tool for use in hunting and in warfare with the Indians, the rifle democratized violence by giving America’s early revolutionaries a practical means for individual action, much as the AK-47 and the improvised explosive device would do for partisans in modern wars. The perceived pre-war need for protection from Indian attack had flooded the frontier with small arms and France provided the gunpowder that fueled the subsequent revolution. Although more accurate in legend than in reality, the rifle encouraged the user to take careful aim at an individual target and

thus worked effectively without requiring disciplined drilled soldiers. It actually went against formal tactics of the time as it could not carry a bayonet the instrument of mass terror that worked with the smoothbore musket's use of mass, if not well aimed, fire. British small arms and artillery had the same shortcomings in their day as tanks, helicopters, and bombers in modern times, that of being so broad and indiscriminate that they became symbols of indifferent authority and the ruthless use of power. Such tools often prove less than useless against the individual "freedom fighters"/terrorists by encouraging widespread resentment against the invader. In time, rebel veterans of Kettle Creek, and their comrades proved that the rifle could win against the disciplined use of the bayonet and smoothbore musket at battles like Cowpens and King's Mountain. At the major battle of Blackstocks in 1780, the militiamen of Wilkes County used the skill of being able to load while lying on the ground described by Baika Harvey in 1775 against Loyalist dragoons and the, by then, battle experienced survivors of the Seventy-first Infantry Regiment. One man with such a weapon could have a decisive effect on a battle by killing or just breaking the will by means of fear of a leader like Boyd who held his group together against seemingly the worst odds by personal charisma. Individual militiamen used their rifles as a means of killing Sharp, Spurgeon, Ferguson and so many others to the end last hope of the men who followed these respective Tory leaders. This weapon had famously played such a role in the decisive battles of Saratoga.<sup>122</sup>

Similarly, swivel guns, blunderbuss, amuzettes, and even small cannons also had a role to play. Swivel guns had been popular on slave ships to prevent uprisings, although usually loaded with peas to prevent serious harm, and easily found use in the frontier forts. Reverend William Tennent, in visiting Augusta in 1775, found the private homes fortified with three pounder cannons mounted on the second floors of the forts. When Richard Pearis, formerly of the Raeburn Creek area, disarmed the surrendered backcountry militia in 1780, following the British

capture of Charleston, he confiscated 3,000 stands of arms, twenty-two swivel guns, and twenty-seven blunderbusses. Small wheel less substitutes for cannons (and small artillery pieces), used at Kettle Creek and elsewhere, were taken from ships or made in the frontier's early blacksmith shops and iron furnaces.<sup>123</sup>

At the cowpens at Kettle Creek on the morning of February 14, 1779, the very personal nature of this political, social, and ethnic conflict on this frontier war revealed itself. Andrew Pickens, John Dooly, and Elijah Clarke ordered their exhausted militiamen to check their rifles and to attack on little more than faith in them. An anonymous source would claim that Clarke sent twenty men to scout the enemy camp and that a signal gun then sounded with the Georgians from the two columns opening fire on Boyd's men "right in their faces," as they leaped up from napping, cooking, and playing "old sledge." Pickens' advance guard, however, disobeyed orders and fired at the enemy sentries, allowing Boyd to personally arrange a successful ambush of some 200 South Carolinians advancing in the main column. At the same time, Dooly and Clarke, respectively, had orders to lead their 140 Georgians through the maze of channels in the swamps adjoining the creek, and the dark, deep sheer wall of cane breaks, to assault the Loyalist position from the rear. Mercifully the season saved them from the insects and snakes that lived in that vast morass at warmer times of the year. Pickens did not know that most of the Loyalists had already camped across the creek or that the sea of cane would prove almost impassable. Three of Dooly's riflemen emerged from behind Boyd's position in the cowpens on the east side of the creek and successfully fired on the Loyalist leader, inflicting mortal wounds. Whig militiamen then attacked the cowpens position from all directions, with rifles and swivel guns as the "battle" became a struggle between almost identical groups of Americans but from different communities, each of which fought for their country. Pickens'

Captain Richard Pollard attacked Loyalist Captain James Lindley's company and captured Lindley.

The Loyalists still significantly outnumbered their attackers and they defended a strong position on the west side of the creek, beyond the fighting. They could have withdrawn from the fight intact and continued on to Wrightsborough and Augusta. Pickens and Dooly had unknowingly only assaulted the Loyalists camped at the cowpen on the east side of the creek. Most of the Boyd's men, perhaps as many as 400, had settled on high ground to the south and west of the marshy waters.

Boyd's regiment both rallied and disintegrated in the face of this determined opposition. Its leader had fallen and the men could not find Lieutenant Colonel John Moore of North Carolina, the second-in-command. Major John Spurgeon of South Carolina, the third-in-command, tried to rally their men. Captain Christopher Neally claimed to have brought up 150 men once the fighting had begun. The Loyalists tried to cross back over the creek, from south and west to north and east, at today's War Hill, in an effort to come to Boyd's aid. Kettle Creek's cane likely towered over fifteen feet high and the trail only served as a narrow, dark tunnel through walls of impenetrable cane. While attempting to pass through the sea of cane in the swampy bottoms, on a narrow path, they collided with a force of fifty men under Lieutenant Colonel Elijah Clarke. The latter charged into the Loyalists. Spurgeon and his men found themselves in a bottleneck wherein they faced ambush a few at a time as they tried to emerge from the canebrakes. At length, the Loyalists gave up and withdrew back as they had come, being fired upon as they fell back. Clarke declined to follow by charging across the creek to place his men in the same position that had just cost their enemy so dearly.

Dooly would marvel that he, Pickens, and Clarke survived a rain of rifle fire while leading their men from horseback and the front although the latter did lose his horse in that charge and

a Captain James Little who had survived Cherokee Ford, Vann's Creek, and other battles of the Revolution nearly died from his wound. They would consider the battle of Kettle Creek to be a success for their cause. The Loyalists guarding the prisoners taken in the earlier fighting upon learning of the battle of Kettle Creek later that day tried to continue on to the British army, but after a day and a night, they surrendered to their captives. Nicholas Welsh would claim that he and Moore had started with 270 men in North Carolina of whom only ninety reached the British army in Georgia. With only twenty of their comrades killed and twenty-two taken prisoner in the battle, the balance of the estimated 500 to 600 Loyalists in the camps on Kettle Creek that morning must have chosen to simply leave and return to their homes in the Carolinas.<sup>124</sup>

The Loyalists, however, also considered Kettle Creek to be a success because hundreds of their number survived the battle. Spurgeon and 270 of his men continued on to Wrightsborough unhindered. From there, they would be escorted to the British army by Captain John Hamilton and his horsemen. Campbell sent to Savannah for clothes for these men. A Loyalist newspaper described these men as "valuable subjects whose zeal, spirit, fortitude and loyalty do honour to the age in which they live, and will immortalize their names in the records of fame."<sup>125</sup>

Their subsequent history failed to achieve such notoriety. They were formed into the Royal South Carolina Volunteers (what subsequently became the Second Battalion of the South Carolina Royalists Regiment under Lieutenant Colonel Evan McLaurin) and into the North Carolina Royal Volunteers under Lieutenant Colonel John Moore. Both units all but ceased to exist by the summer of 1779 due to casualties and desertions. Of the few men who remained, they would have a brief moment of glory when they coincidentally found themselves in the worst of the fighting at Savannah on October 9, 1779. They received no recognition for their part with the other British forces in driving off an attack by a combined American and



French force, one of the largest victories of the war although a British periodical summed up the men who made up Boyd's following as:

It appears that the loyal party, even in this quarter where it was strongest, (being in a great measure composed of emigrants from North Britain,) was infinitely inferior to The ill-affected [the Whigs]; and without the great and continual assistance of the royal army, the well-affected inhabitants [the Loyalists], in no small part of America, were in a condition to make head against the rebels.<sup>126</sup>

Decades later, Andrew Pickens agreed. He wrote of Kettle Creek as “the severest check & chastisement, the Tories ever received in South Carolina or Georgia.”<sup>127</sup> That claim seems exaggerated considering the size of the defeats that John Moore, John Spurgeon, and others sustained over the next two years. Had Pickens been able to thoroughly defeat Boyd's party to the extent that few of them reached the British lines, Kettle Creek could have been, without question, such a strategic victory for the Patriots. He would be correct, however, if he meant that the battle demonstrated conclusively that the king's followers could achieve little militarily without and, sometimes, even with the regular British army. Any effective, Loyalist support of military value that had been on the frontier in 1775 and 1776 had almost ceased to exist by February 14, 1779.<sup>128</sup>

British leaders like Archibald Campbell, Lord Cornwallis, and Robert Gray would leave memoirs and papers to explain why this campaign and those that followed failed for want of Loyalist allies while Whigs like Andrew Pickens and Tarleton Brown would write partisan reminiscences that would encourage a contempt for and misunderstanding of the Americans who did, or came under suspicion of having, risked their lives and property for the cause of British colonial America. The Loyalists had no place in the historical record to defend themselves but their story did not always remain secret. In 1829, for example, an anonymous article published across America reminded the public that the United States began in places like Kettle Creek where individuals were persecuted violently for belonging to minorities or at least

having minority points of view.<sup>129</sup> That history largely disappeared, however, to be replaced by generations of anti-Tory propaganda and later, during the ordeal of the Civil Rights and the war protests of the 1960s and 1970s, by condescending views of the king's followers summed up by historian Richard M. Ketchum and others have described as "as merely good people who chose to remain loyal to their king."<sup>130</sup> Historians must continue to seek the story of these special rebels from the studies of their communities and their resulting actions as individuals at places like Kettle Creek.

The men who lost that battle and so many others that followed had been a part of a secular movement with non-secular roots. Their faith had been strong within their communities and had been kept alive by Boyd—while he still lived—despite tremendous difficulties of time and distance. In the end, however, hard realities persuaded them to give up and return to their homes or to find refuge elsewhere. While historians have written about the creation of communities of exiles of the king's friends after the war, the Revolution also often resulted in the destruction of many such exclusive groups in America. Historian Hugh McCall, likely one of Pickens' Kettle Creek veterans, so wrote of the end of Boyd's following:

Dispirited by the loss of their leader, and sore under the lashes of the Americans, the enemy fled from the scene of action; their army exploded, and some of the fragments fled to Florida, some to the Creek [Indian] nation, some found their way to the Cherokees, some returned to their homes and submitted to the mercy of the American government. . .<sup>131</sup>

The Tory settlements that survived ceased to have any importance after the war and the withdrawal of the British army. A visitor to the Raeburn Creek Quaker meeting in 1792, for example, found it a poor congregation whose meeting house had a dirt floor. Wrightsborough similarly gradually faded completely out of existence.<sup>132</sup>

The king's government, however, continued its liberal policy of protecting and encouraging diverse ethnic communities in its remaining colonial possessions, including those formed from the Loyalist refugees. These people would strengthen Britain's hold in some lands and created new colonies from Central America to British India to the first settlers of Australia. Linda Colley has pointed out that, overall, the number of Americans who would leave the new United States for British possessions, almost all of whom qualified as members of various ethnic minorities, comes to more than five times the number of persons who abandoned France after its revolution, an example of how an empire "so often assumed now to be necessarily racist in operation and ethos, could sometimes be conspicuously poly-ethnic in quality and policy, because it had to be."<sup>133</sup> Among the Kettle Creek Loyalists, John Hamilton, Robert Alexander, Christopher Neally, John Murphy, Zachariah Gibbes, Nicholas Welsh, William Payne, William Young, and others lived to remove to distant lands and file claims with the British government for their respective property losses. William Knox, the designer of the southern Loyalist strategy, lost his land in Georgia to confiscation. Most of the slaves he had transferred to Jamaica died in hurricanes. Virtually bankrupt, he replaced his deceased friend Sir James Wright, as attorney for the Loyalist claimants. After years of petitioning, he received less than half of his claim and a relatively small pension. Like the Loyalists whose cause he had championed, he had long before lost his position and credibility in the British government. Whatever he and his fellow "good Americans" received, despite his efforts, must have fallen far short of just compensation for their sufferings and for what they left behind.<sup>134</sup>

Overall, however, the white Loyalists fared better than did their Indian and African-American allies. The British abandoned the former and most of the latter. The self-emancipated slaves left behind in the South founded isolated free communities that state militias later destroyed.<sup>135</sup> Although white Americans, Loyalist and Whig, who moved into the mountains,

swamps, and western lands away from the plantation economy after the Revolution would be seen as treating African-Americans, free and slave, with more deference than did some people who lived near plantations, these same families also had a racist distain for all dark skinned peoples that encouraged white migration even more than any inability to compete with black labor.<sup>136</sup> An estimated 5,000 Georgia slaves, close to one third of their total population, fled to the British army but, for all of the thirteen colonies, the king's government only took 3,000 slaves to freedom, largely to Nova Scotia and later to Sierra Leone. They failed to prosper and, by 1800, they had begun a series of unsuccessful rebellions in the latter against British rule led in part by Henry Washington, a former slave of George Washington.<sup>137</sup>

The king's followers who abandoned the United States forever, or for a time, have been documented but those Americans so alienated with the new country also included unknown numbers of embittered individuals who had supported the Revolution. Poet Adrienne Rich, in calling to all sides in the Vietnam conflict two centuries later, could also have written to survivors of America's war for political independence about how any birth is accompanied by pain: "to remember her true country, remember his suffering land: remember that blessing and cursing are born as twins and separated at birth to meet again in mourning [;] that the internal emigrant is the most *homesick* of all women and of all men [;] that every flag that flies today is a cry of pain."<sup>138</sup>

Many individuals and communities in the South had reasons to believe that their sacrifices had been wasted or, at the least, settled nothing. The Southern Strategy continued in a mutated form as British ambitions for the American frontier.<sup>139</sup> It finally came to an end at the Battle of New Orleans on January 8, 1815 when the often disappointed United States regulars, joined by militiamen, Crackers, Choctaw Indians, Freedmen, pirates, Frenchmen, and mixtures

of seemingly every other group in the country's western lands defeated the red coated armies of King George III for one last time. This victory guaranteed the claim of the United States to the vast Louisiana Territory and West Florida. It moved what had been conquering the frontier to what would be known as the Atlantic to the Pacific ambition of "Manifest Destiny." At the same time, the struggle by nations for the frontier ceased to interfere with a practical reconciliation of the peoples of the frontier. Historian Robert M. Calhoon has called this pragmatic accommodation to reality, when unhindered by such artificial restraints as Jim Crow laws, as "moderation."<sup>140</sup>

It also called up numerous ghosts of the American Revolution. Andrew Jackson, the successful commanding general and architect of the victory, emotionally and physically carried scars as a victim of the original Southern Strategy. A product of the economic, racial, and social complexities of the frontier, he would become an icon of entrepreneurial and political empowerment in the West. The ideals of what came to be known as "Jacksonian Democracy" would include practical innovations that have come to be a greater and more successful contribution to all people having control of their government and lives than the Declaration of Independence or anything called for by the Enlightenment. A week after Jackson's great victory, in the frontier liberal state of Georgia, another British army occupied St. Mary's, the home of the by then deceased bandit terrorist Daniel McGirth and on the centuries old invasion route to and from East Florida. The arrival of news that the War of 1812 had ended caused the withdrawal of these soldiers before they could continue on to try to repeat Archibald Campbell's success at Savannah of more than thirty-six years earlier. Great Britain and the independent United States would now move to form the very alliance that William Knox and Benjamin Franklin had separately and publicly called for all of those many years earlier. This Anglo-American unity, sometimes formally acknowledged and at other times less officially

carried out by policy, still continues to this day through many adventures in many lands and among very different peoples.

## NOTES

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<sup>1</sup> George Fenwick Jones, *The Salzburger Saga: Religious Exiles and Other Germans Along the Savannah* (Athens, Ga., 1984), ix-x.

<sup>2</sup> From an interview with John Ydstie, January 7, 2007, on the National Public Radio Program *Weekend Sunday Edition*.

<sup>3</sup> Joshua Howard, "'Things Here Wear a Melancholy Appearance': The American Defeat at Briar Creek," *Georgia Historical Quarterly* 88 (Winter 2004): 478-79. For the military events and planning of the Southern Strategy see John Shy, "British Strategy for Pacifying the Southern Colonies, 1778-1781" in Jeffrey J. Crow and Larry E. Tise, eds., *The Southern Experience in The American Revolution* (Chapel Hill, 1978), 155-73, and Richard S. Dukes, "Anatomy of a Failure: British Military Policy in the Southern Campaign of the American Revolution, 1775-1781" (Ph. D. diss., University of South Carolina at Columbia, 1993).

<sup>4</sup> Robert S. Davis, "Georgia History and the American Revolution," *Georgia Social Science Journal* 10 (spring 1979): 172-81.

<sup>5</sup> Robert S. Davis, "Change and Remembrance: How Promoting the Kettle Creek Battlefield went from the Means to becoming an End in Itself," *Journal of the Georgia Association of Historians* 24 (2003): 61-79. Historian Hugh McCall gave much higher casualty figures in his 1816

history: seventy Loyalists killed and seventy-five wounded, while the Whigs suffered nine men killed and some twenty men wounded. The higher numbers were likely supplied by Andrew Pickens, from memory, decades after the battle. Hugh McCall, *The History of Georgia*, 2 vols. (Savannah, 1811 and 1816), 2: 201-3; Andrew Pickens to Henry Lee, August 28, 1811, Thomas Sumter Papers, 1 VV 107, Lyman C. Draper Collection, State Historical Society of Wisconsin, Madison.

<sup>6</sup> Quotation from *The Annual Register or a View of the History, Politics, and Literature for the Year 1781* (London, 1781): 83. Writer Donald B. Chidsey used the battle of Kettle Creek to make the same point in his book *The War in the South: The Carolinas and Georgia in the American Revolution* (New York, 1969), 9-12.

<sup>7</sup> Linda Colley, *Captives* (New York, 2002), 236.

<sup>8</sup> "Colonel Robert Gray's Observations on the War in Carolina," *South Carolina Historical and Genealogical Magazine* 11 (July 1910): 153; Carole Waterson Troxler, "The Migration of Carolina and Georgia Loyalists to Nova Scotia and New Brunswick," (Ph. D. diss., University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, 1974), 8-17; Robert M. Calhoun, *The Loyalists in Revolutionary America, 1760-1781* (New York, 1973), 439, 448-57; Wallace Brown, *The Good Americans: The Loyalists in the American Revolution* (New York, 1969), 98.



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<sup>9</sup> Baika Harvey to Thomas Baika, December 30, 1775, Orkney Island Archives, Scotland. The different versions of the Georgia petitions and related articles in support of Wright appear in Robert S. Davis, comp., *Georgia Citizens and Soldiers of the American Revolution* (Easley, SC, 1979), 11-19, and Mary B. Warren and Jack M. Jones, comps., *Georgia Governor and Council Journals, 1774-1777* (Athens: Heritage Papers, 2006), 55-58. Harvey would have had a hard time distinguishing one group of Americans from the other. Whigs would sometimes wear white paper and the Loyalists green twigs/pine knots, respectively, in their hats as political identification. Thomas Young, "Memoirs of Major Thomas Young," *South Carolina Magazine of Ancestral Research* 4 (Summer 1976): 183; William Speer to John A. Speer, December 9, 1869, copy in the possession of the author. General Augustin Prévost wrote that Loyalists identified themselves with either a red cross or pine twigs in their hats. Prévost talk to the Creeks, March 13, 1779, Colonial Office Papers 5/80, folio 240, National Archives of the United Kingdom, London.

<sup>10</sup> William H. Nelson, *The American Tory* (London, 1961), 87; Brown, *The Good Americans*, 111-12, 122; Clyde R. Ferguson, "Carolina and Georgia Patriot and Loyalist Militia in Action, 1778-1783," in Crow and Tise, *The Southern Experience in The American Revolution*, 174-76.

<sup>11</sup> Quoted in Michael Stephenson, *Patriot Battles: How The War of Independence Was Fought* (New York, 2007), 313-14.

<sup>12</sup> Edward J. Cashin, *Governor Henry Ellis and The Transformation of British North America* (Athens, Ga., 1994), 217-19; Calhoun, *The Loyalists in Revolutionary America*, 35-36.

<sup>13</sup> Leland J. Bellot, *William Knox: The Life and Thought of an Eighteenth Century Imperialist* (Austin, Tx., 1977), 39-40, 143-4, 155-57, 163-65.

<sup>14</sup> Memorial to Lord George Germain of Messrs. Greenwood, Higginson, Clark, Milligan & Nutt, November 19, 1778, in *Catalogue Two Hundred Seventy-three William Reese Company* (New Haven, Ct., 2009), item 14.

<sup>15</sup> Harold E. Davis, *The Fledgling Province: Social and Cultural Life in Colonial Georgia, 1733-1776* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1976), 7-32, 193-232; J. Revell Carr, *Seeds of Discontent: the Deep Roots of the American Revolution, 1650-1750* (New York: Walker & Co., 2008), 148-52; John Thomas Scott, "'Next to Nothing?': Benjamin Ingham's Mission to Georgia," *Georgia Historical Quarterly* 92 (fall 2008): 287-320; Heard Robertson, *Loyalism in Revolutionary Georgia* (Atlanta, Ga., 1978), 3, 19.

<sup>16</sup> For a discussion of authority and society in colonial Georgia see Andrew C. Lannen, "Liberty and Authority in Colonial Georgia, 1717-1776," (Ph. D. diss., Louisiana State University and Agricultural and Mechanical College, 2002).

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<sup>17</sup> Richard A. Ketchum, "England's Vietnam: The American Revolution," *American Heritage Magazine* 22 (June 1971): 8-9, and idem, *Saratoga: Turning Point of America's Revolutionary War* (New York, 1997), 70-71, 80-81, 108-9, 111, 239, 252-54, 315-16. John Connolly proposed a plan in 1780 for rallying landless white squatters on the Ohio frontier for the King's cause. Robert M. Calhoun, "Civil, Revolutionary or Partisan: The Loyalists and the Nature of the War for Independence," in Robert M. Calhoun, Timothy M. Barnes, and Robert S. Davis, eds., *Tory Insurgents: The Loyalist Perception and Other Essays* (1989; special expanded edition, Columbia, SC, 2010), 215.

<sup>18</sup> Robert Harvey, "A Few Bloody Noses": *The Realities and Mythologies of the American Revolution* (New York, 2001), 81, 252-54, 315-16, 427; Nicholas Rogers, *Crowds, Culture, and Politics in Georgian Britain* (Oxford, UK, 1998), 152-75; Hugh Bicheno, *Rebels & Redcoats: The American Revolutionary War* (New York, 2004), 255. Yorktown thus joined Saratoga, Kettle Creek, King's Mountain, Cowpens, and Guilford Courthouse on the long list of military engagements to which the Loyalist strategy contributed, at least in part, to the overall defeat of the king's cause in America. Richard Holmes' remarks come from his 2005 BBC documentary *Rebels and Redcoats* but cannot be found in the series' companion volume by Bicheno, *Rebels & Redcoats*. For discussions of the justification of comparing the American Revolution to Vietnam see Stephenson, *Patriot Battles*, xviii-xxi, 19, 298; and

Robert M. Calhoon, *Revolutionary America: An Interpretive Overview* (New York, 1976), 108. Several books have recently compared Vietnam to Iraq after the Second Gulf War including Kenneth J. Campbell, *A Tale of Two Quagmires: Iraq, Vietnam, and the Hard Lessons of War* (Boulder: Paradigm, 2007); Lloyd G. Gardner and Marilyn B. Young, eds., *Iraq and the Lessons of Vietnam* (New York: New Press, 2007); and John Dumbrell and David Ryan, eds., *Vietnam in Iraq* (New York: Routledge, 2007).

<sup>19</sup> Ian R. Christie and Benjamin W. Labaree, *Empire or Independence 1760-1776: A British-American Dialogue on the Coming of the American Revolution* (New York, 1976), 4-5, 43; Joseph J. Ellis, *His Excellency George Washington* (New York, 2004), 123; Stanley Weintraub, *Iron Tears: America's Battle for Freedom, Britain's Quagmire, 1775-1783* (New York, 2005), 223-39, 242-44; Maurice R. O'Connell, *Irish Politics and Social Conflict in the Age of the American Revolution* (Philadelphia, 1965), 146, 150, 190, 394-96; Reginald Coupland, *The American Revolution and the British Empire* (New York, 1965), 85-128.

<sup>20</sup> Lord Carlisle to Lady Carlisle, July 21, 1778, in Historical Manuscripts Commission, comp., *The Manuscripts of The Earl of Carlisle Preserved at Castle Howard* (London, 1897), 356-57. The Carroll quote comes from Ketchum, *Saratoga*, 10-11.

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<sup>21</sup> George Germain to Sir Henry Clinton, March 8, 1778, in K. G. Davies, ed., *Documents of The American Revolution, 1770-1783*, 19 vols. (Dublin, Ire., 1973-1983), 15: 58-59; Sir Henry Clinton to H. F. C. Pelham-Clinton, 2nd Duke of Newcastle, July 27, 1778, Ne C 2648, Newcastle Collection, Manuscripts and Special Collections, University of Nottingham, Nottingham, United Kingdom.

<sup>22</sup> Robert S. Davis, "The British Invasion of Georgia," *Atlanta Historical Journal* 24 (winter 1980): 1-8; Barnet Schecter, *The Battle for New York: The City at the Heart of the American Revolution* (New York, 2002), 306-7; Stephenson, *Patriot Battles*, 67; John Fauchereau Grimké, "Journal of the Campaign to the Southward," *South Carolina Historical and Genealogical Magazine*, 12 (April 1911): 63-64; Archibald Campbell, *Journal of An Expedition against The Rebels of Georgia in North America*, ed. Colin Campbell (Augusta, Ga., 1981), x-xi, 4-7, 103 n. 12.

<sup>23</sup> Lawrence E. Babits and Joshua B. Howard, *Long, Obstinate, and Bloody: The Battle of Guilford Courthouse* (Chapel Hill, 2009), 86; Campbell, *Journal*, 9-10, 104, n. 20; Davis, "The British Invasion of Georgia," 14-15; *Newcastle Journal or General Advertiser* (Newcastle-upon-Tyne, England), February 10, 1776, p. 2, c. 2; Ed Brumby, historian of the Seventy-first Regiment, to author, September 2, 2002; Stephenson, *Patriot Battles*, 328-31, 336-29. For a history of the Seventy-first Regiment see J. Ralph Harper, *The Fraser*

*Highlanders* (Montreal, Can., 1979) and various Internet sites. Other Highland Regiments had problems with attempts by the British military to add "dregs" from London to Scottish regiments and to attempt to shore up English units with Scotsmen who had enlisted believing that they would serve with men of their own culture. David Stewart, *Sketches of the Character, Manners, and Present State of the Highlanders of Scotland with details of the Military Service of the Highland Regiments*, 2 vols. (3rd ed., Edinburgh: Constable, 1825), 1: 402-403.

<sup>24</sup> Fred Anderson, *The War that made America: a Short History of The French and Indian War* (New York, 2005), 227.

<sup>25</sup> Harold B. Hancock, *The Loyalists of Revolutionary Delaware* (Newark, De., 1977), 39-59; John Shy, "The American Revolution: The Military Conflict Considered as a Revolutionary War," in Stephen G. Kurtz and James H. Hudson, eds., *Essays on the American Revolution* (Chapel Hill, 1973), 133-35, 145 n. 36; Max Boot, *Invisible Armies: an Epic History of Guerrilla Warfare from Ancient Times to the Present* (New York, 2013), 68-69.

<sup>26</sup> William B. Willcox, *Portrait of a General: Sir Henry Clinton in The War of Independence* (New York, 1964), 320-22; Shy, *A People Numerous*, 203-4; Paul H. Smith, *Loyalists and Redcoats: A Study in British Revolutionary Policy* (Chapel Hill, NC, 1964), 93, 102, 202; R. Arthur

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Bowler, *Logistics and the Failure of the British Army in America, 1775-1783* (Princeton, NJ, 1975), 245. For negative views of Clinton and his major associates see Alexander Rose, *Washington's Spies: The Story of America's First Spy Ring* (New York, 2006), 323, fn. 108; Robert S. Lambert, *South Carolina Loyalists in the American Revolution* (Columbia, SC, 1987), 98-100; and the references in Thomas Jones, *History of New York during the Revolutionary War*, ed. Edward F. DeLancey, (2 vols., New York, 1879).

<sup>27</sup> Boyd was so little known that he appears in only one surviving record relating to the events before the battle at Kettle Creek, the deposition of William Millen of January 28, 1779 now in the Miscellaneous Papers, 1776-1789, War of Revolution, Military Collection, North Carolina State Archives, Raleigh. The Clinton Papers in the William L. Clements Library and in the National Archives of the United Kingdom omit any reference to Boyd before the battle of Kettle Creek.

<sup>28</sup> For the military events of the British invasion of Georgia see David K. Wilson, *The Southern Strategy: Britain's Conquest of South Carolina and Georgia* (Columbia, SC, 2005).

<sup>29</sup> Charles Stedman, *The History of Origin, Progress, and Termination of the American War*, 2 vols. (Dublin, Ire., 1794), 2: 119; Campbell, *Journal*, 122; McCall, *History of Georgia*, 2: 192. For John Hamilton's

background see Carole Watterson Troxler, "John Hamilton" in William S. Powell, ed., *Dictionary of North Carolina Biography*, 6 vols. (Chapel Hill, NC, 1988), 3: 16-17, and Robert S. Davis, "Biography: Colonel John Hamilton of the Royal North Carolina Regiment," *Southern Campaigns of the American Revolution*, 3 (5) (May 2006): 32-34, online journal at: <http://www.southerncampaign.org/>

<sup>30</sup> Campbell, *Journal*, 6, 61-65, 76; *Royal Georgia Gazette* (Savannah), February 11, 1779; "Case of the Loyalists," *Political Magazine* 4 (April 1783): 266; Stephenson, *Patriot Battles*, 67-68, 130 n. 196.

<sup>31</sup> Campbell, *Journal*, 91-93, 99; *South Carolina & American General Gazette*, March 11, 1779. In July 1779. John Dooly wrote to General Benjamin Lincoln from Augusta asking for medicines and two hogsheads of rum to relieve the sufferings of his men. Dooly to Lincoln, July 27, 1779, in Michael J. O'Brien, "The Doolys of Georgia," *Journal of the American Irish Historical Society*, 26 (1927): facing page 178.

<sup>32</sup> [newspaper abstracts from the *South Carolina Gazette*], 3 VV 41-45, Draper Collection; Tarleton Brown, *Memoirs of Tarleton Brown* (Barnwell, SC: Barnwell County Museum and Historical Board, 1999), xii, 9; Williamson to Lincoln, April 28, 1779, Benjamin Lincoln Papers, Massachusetts Historical Society, Boston.



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<sup>33</sup> Revolutionary War pension claim of Williams Smith, SC S 4855, *Revolutionary War Pension and Bounty Land Warrant Application Files, 1800-1900* (National Archives microfilm M804, roll 755); Gregory Palmer, *Biographical Sketches of Loyalists of The American Revolution* (Westport, Ct., 1984), 918; Bicheno, *Rebels & Redcoats*, 181; Ferguson, "Carolina and Georgia Patriot and Loyalist Militia," 178-83; Robert S. Davis, *Georgians in the Revolution* (Easley, SC, 1986), 13-16, 20, 108-11. For the Battle of Briar Creek see Joshua Howard, "'Things Here Wear a Melancholy Appearance,': The American Defeat at Briar Creek," *Georgia Historical Quarterly* 88 (winter 2004): 477-98.

<sup>34</sup> John E. Ferling, *Almost a Miracle: The American Victory in The War of Independence* (New York, 2007), 386, 416; Stewart, *Sketches of the Character, Manners, and Present State of the Highlanders of Scotland*, 2: 123.

<sup>35</sup> Bellot, *William Knox*, 168, 181-82; Jones, *History of New York during the Revolutionary War*, 1: 290-91. For more on the possibility of Georgia remaining a part of the British Empire as part of a peace proposal see Kenneth Coleman, *The American Revolution in Georgia* (Athens, Ga., 1958), 144, 167.

<sup>36</sup> Bellot, *William Knox*, 168; Nelson, *The American Tory*, 91-92.

<sup>37</sup> Weintraub, *Iron Tears*, 240-41; Robert D. Bass, *The Green Dragoon: The Lives of Banastre Tarleton and Mary Robinson* (New York, 1957),

118-24, 445, and *Gamecock: The Life and Campaigns of General Thomas Sumter* (New York, 1961), 103-11; Ferling, *Almost a Miracle*, 415-28, 435-33, 468-75.

<sup>38</sup> Robert S. Davis, "The Invisible Soldiers: The Georgia Militia at the Siege of Savannah," *Atlanta Historical Journal* 25 (winter 1991): 32, 60 n. 27, and "Lord Montagu's Mission to Charleston in 1781: American POWs for the King's Cause in Jamaica," *South Carolina Historical Magazine* 84 (April 1983): 92, 94; Franklin and Mary Wickwire, *Cornwallis: The American Adventure* (New York, 1970), 221; Weintraub, *Iron Tears*, 277; Bicheno, *Rebels & Redcoats*, 232; "Character of Lord Rawdon, character of Lieut. Col. Doyle &c.," Georgia Papers, Chambers Collection, New York Public Library.

<sup>39</sup> One of the great curiosities of the American Revolution must have been the German soldiers of the French Royal Deux-Pont Regiment facing the Hessians at Yorktown, Germans fighting for foreign powers in the New World, half a globe away from their homes. Don Troiani, Earl J. Coates, and James L. Kochan, *Don Troiani's Soldiers in America, 1754-1865* (Mechanicsburg, Pa., 1998), 80.

<sup>40</sup> "An ADDRESS to any People that have been attacked, and may be attacked, that they may consider," *Royal Georgia Gazette* (Savannah), August 12, 1779; Jim Piecuch, *Three Peoples, One King: Loyalists, Indians, and Slaves in the Revolutionary South, 1775-1782* (Columbia,

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SC, 2008), 5; Stephenson, *Patriot Battles*, 55-62; Davis, *Georgians in the American Revolution*, 24 n. 49; Bellot, *William Knox*, 142, 144; Shy, *People Numerous and Armed*, 186-90. For histories of the individual Loyalist provincial units see Thomas B. Allen and Todd W. Braisted, *The Loyalist Corps: Americans in the Service of the King* (Takoma Park, Md., 2011). That the king's auditors hounded Campbell and, after his death his heirs, for years over such accounts and his claim to pay as a brigadier general resulted in his writing and his family keeping his memoir of the Georgia campaign. Campbell, *Journal*, 87, 103 n. 12.

<sup>41</sup> Adrienne C. Rich, *An Atlas of a Difficult World: Poems, 1988-1991* (New York, 1986), Section XI, 23.

<sup>42</sup> Davis, *Georgians in the American Revolution*, 103-4; Dorothy Jeter Barnum and George Ely Russell, "James Johnson alias Ingram: A Southern Odyssey," *National Genealogical Society Quarterly* 76 (March 1988): 8-9.

<sup>43</sup> Rachel N. Klein, *Unification of a Slave State: The Rise of the Planter Class in the South Carolina Backcountry, 1760-1808* (Chapel Hill, NC, 1990), 63; Shy, *A People Numerous*, 232; Bicheno, *Rebels & Redcoats*, 179; J. H. Cruger to Charles Cornwallis, September 28, 1780, Cornwallis Papers, 30/11/64, p. 116, British Public Record Office; Heard Robertson and Edward J. Cashin, *Augusta and the American Revolution* (Darien, Ga., 1975), 48-50; Elijah Clarke to

"Gov. Campbell," November 5, 1780, Thomas Sumter Papers, 4VV272-73, Draper Collection.

<sup>44</sup> *South Carolina and American General Gazette* (Charleston), September 27, 1780, p. 2, c. 3.

<sup>45</sup> Willcox, *Portrait of a General*, 321; Dukes, "Anatomy of a Failure," 169-71, 295-99; Lambert, *South Carolina Loyalists*, 90, 98-103; Terry W. Lipscomb, *Battles, Skirmishes, and Actions of the American Revolution in South Carolina* (Columbia: South Carolina Department of Archives and History, 1991), 1-2.

<sup>46</sup> Richard Holmes' remarks come from his 2005 BBC documentary *Rebels and Redcoats*.

<sup>47</sup> Davis, *Georgians in the Revolution*, 215, 224; Samuel Kelly, *Samuel Kelly, an Eighteenth Century Seaman*, ed. Crosbie Garstin (New York, 1925), 51; David Ramsay, *The History of the Revolution of South-Carolina* (Trenton, NJ, 1785), 1: 176; Sir James Wright to Sir Henry Clinton, February 3, 1780, Sir Henry Clinton Papers, vol. 84, item 9, William L. Clements Library, Ann Arbor, Mi.

<sup>48</sup> Campbell went on to a highly successful career in Jamaica and India. Robert S. Davis, "Portrait of a Governor," *Atlanta Historical Journal* 26 (spring 1982): 45-48.

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<sup>49</sup> For the issues of the French and Indian Wars see Fred Anderson, *The War that made America: a Short History of the French and Indian War* (New York, 2005).

<sup>50</sup> Gordon B. Smith, *Morningstars of Liberty: The Revolutionary War in Georgia, 1775-1783* (Milledgeville, Ga., 2006), 183-84.

<sup>51</sup> Gary B. Nash, *The Unknown American Revolution: The Unruly Birth of Democracy and the Struggle to Create America* (New York, 2005), 108-109. For the history of the North Carolina Regulators see Marjoleine Kars, *Breaking Loose Together: The Regulator Rebellion in Pre-Revolutionary North Carolina* (Chapel Hill, NC, 2002).

<sup>52</sup> For the history of the South Carolina Regulators see Richard M. Brown, *The South Carolina Regulators: the Story of the First American Vigilante Movement* (Cambridge, Ma., 1963).

<sup>53</sup> Martha F. Franklin, "The Quaker Settlement of Wrightsborough" (Masters Thesis, Georgia Southern College, 1984), 30; Nash, *The Unknown American Revolution*, 108; Klein, *Unification of a Slave State*, 95.

<sup>54</sup> Jack P. Greene, "Independence, Improvement and Authority: Toward a Framework for Understanding the Histories of the Southern Backcountry during the Era of the American Revolution," in Ronald Hoffman, Thad

W. Tate, and Peter J. Albert, eds., *An Uncivil War: The Southern Backcountry during the American Revolution* (Charlottesville, Va., 1985), 17-20. For a general discussion of frontier social conflict in the colonial period, see Eric Hinderaker and Peter C. Mancall, *At The Edge of Empire: The Backcountry in British North America* (Baltimore, Md., 2003) and William R. Nester, *The Frontier War for American Independence* (Mechanicsburg, Pa., 2004).

<sup>55</sup> For the Dooly family see chapter thirteen. For examples of other such families see Robert W. Ramsey, *Carolina Cradle: Settlement of the Northwest Carolina Frontier, 1747-1762* (Chapel Hill, NC, 1964). Members of the Maverick family could stand as representatives of thousands of such families. They had been fighting in that struggle since the earliest days of the Massachusetts Bay Colony to the extent that by the time the family had crossed the continent, they had given their name as "a synonym for independent eccentricity in America." David H. Fischer, *Albion's Seed: Four British Folkways in America* (New York, 1989), 785.

<sup>56</sup> Brian Crozier, *A Theory of Conflict* (New York, 1975), 104.

<sup>57</sup> Brown, *The Good Americans*, 96, 126-46; Rachel N. Klein, "Frontier Planters and the American Revolution: The South Carolina Backcountry, 1775-1782," in Hoffman, et al, *An Uncivil War*, 40-50.

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<sup>58</sup> Jim Piecuch, "Incompatible Allies: Loyalists, Slaves, and Indians in Revolutionary South Carolina" in John Resch and Walter Sargent, eds., *War & Society in the American Revolution: Mobilization and Home Fronts* (DeKalb: Northern Illinois University Press, 2007), 191-214. Ironically, in 1775 when a group of Loyalists captured a wagon load of munitions sent by the Whigs to the Cherokees, the Loyalists used that event to claim that the coastal Whigs intended to use the Indians against frontiersmen reluctant to join the Revolution. Kevin Phillips, *1775: A Good Year for Revolution* (New York: Penguin, 2012), 181-82.

<sup>59</sup> Jesse Hogan Motes III and Margaret Peckham Motes, comps., *Laurens and Newberry Counties South Carolina: Saluda and Little Rivers Settlements 1749-1775* (Greenville, SC, 1994), 13-22.

<sup>60</sup> Alex M. Hitz, "The Earliest Settlements in Wilkes County," *Georgia Historical Quarterly* 40 (winter 1956): 260-80; Robert S. Davis, *Thomas Ansley and the American Revolution in Georgia* (Red Springs, NC, 1981), 11-12; Louise Frederick Hays, comp., "Indian Depredations 1787-1825," five volumes of unpublished typescripts (Works Projects Administration, 1939), Georgia Archives, Morrow, 2: 749-50, 758-62, 963-65; Andrew Williamson to James Bowie, October 14, 1778, James Bowie Papers, New York Public Library; Robert S. Davis, "George

Galphin and the Creek Congress of 1777," *Proceedings and Papers of the Georgia Association of Historians 1982* (Marietta, Ga., 1983), 23.

<sup>61</sup> For an in-depth study of these tactics see John Grenier, *The First Way of War: American War Making on the Frontier* (Cambridge, Ma., 2005).

<sup>62</sup> For biographical information on Clarke, Dooly, and Pickens see Richard L. Blanco, ed., *The American Revolution, 1775-1783: An Encyclopedia* (New York, 1993), 322-24, 480-81, 1299-1300.

<sup>63</sup> See Margaret E. Newell, *From Dependency to Independence: Economic Revolution in Colonial New England* (Ithaca, NY, 1998).

<sup>64</sup> Eliza Bowen, *Chronicles of Wilkes County, Georgia*, ed. Mary B. Warren (Danielsville, Ga., 1978), 148-49; [no author], *History of Liberty Church, Wilkes County, Georgia* (Richmond, Va., 1904), 1; George Howe, *History of The Presbyterian Church in South Carolina*, 2 vols. (Columbia, SC, 1870), 1: 659. For the meaning of "Liberty" as merely a political/military cause in the last days of the American Revolution see the deposition of Miriam Lincecum, February 14, 1782, in Davis, *Georgians in the American Revolution*, 167.

<sup>65</sup> E. Merton Coulter, "Elijah Clarke's Foreign Intrigues and the 'Trans-Oconee Republic,'" *Mississippi Valley Historical Review*, 10 (extra number, November 1921): 260-79.



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<sup>66</sup> Arthur Dobbs, "A Scheme to Increase the Colonies and Commerce of Britain," Cholmondeley Houghton 84, pp. 18-19, Ms No. 68, University Libraries, Cambridge, England.

<sup>67</sup> Robert M. Weir, *Colonial South Carolina: A History* (Millwood, NY, 1983), 111-12, 208-9 and "The Last of American Freemen" *Studies in the Political Culture of the Colonial and Revolutionary South* (Macon, Ga., 1986), 118; Franklin, "The Quaker Settlement of Wrightsborough," 25; Harvey, "A Few Bloody Noses," 6; Edward J. Cashin, *Lachlan McGillivray, Indian Trader* (Athens, Ga., 1992), 235.

<sup>68</sup> Robert M. Calhoun, *The Loyalist Perception and Other Essays* (Columbia, SC, 1989), 11; Brown, *The Good Americans*, 46. A John Boyd, Jr., who may or may not have been the Loyalist leader at Kettle Creek built a mill in Rowan County between the Moravian settlement and the North Carolina Quaker meeting houses in 1763. Jo white Linn, comp., *Abstracts of the Minutes of the Court of Pleas and Quarter Sessions Rowan County, North Carolina 1763-1774* (Salisbury, NC: the author, 1979), 9; Henry Mouzon, *An Accurate Map of North and South Carolina* (London: Sayer and Bennett, 1775). For the ethnic diversity of the backcountry see David Colin Cross, Steven D. Smith, Martha A. Zierden, and Richard D. Brooks, eds., *The Southern Backcountry: Interdisciplinary Perspectives on Frontier Community* (Knoxville, Tn., 1998); Robert W. Ramsey, *Carolina Cradle: Settlement of the Northwest Carolina Frontier, 1747-1762* (Chapel Hill, NC, 1964); and George

Lloyd Johnson, Jr., *The Frontier in the Colonial South: South Carolina Backcountry, 1736-1800* (Westport, Ct., 1997).

<sup>69</sup> Robert V. Hine, *Community on the American Frontier: Separate but not Alone* (Norman, Ok., 1980), 176-78; "Tories," *Southern Confederacy* (Atlanta), June 28, 1862; John C. Inscoe and Robert C. Kenzer, *Enemies of the State: New Perspectives on Unionists in the Civil War* (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 2001), 10-11.

<sup>70</sup> During his long life, Husband would continuously stir up rebellions that he avoided physically participating in due to his pacifist principles. As an exile from the South, Husband would support the American Revolution but he opposed the United States Constitution and he helped to organize the Whiskey Rebellion. See Mark H. Jones, "Herman Husband: Millenarian, Carolina Regulator, and Whiskey Rebel," (Ph. D. diss., Northern Illinois University, 1982).

<sup>71</sup> Kars, *Breaking Loose Together*, 135; Robert S. Davis, *Quaker Records in Georgia: Wrightsborough, 1772-1793, Friendsborough, 1775-1777* (Augusta, Ga., 1986), 15. For examples of political loyalties and other attitudes about religion in the frontier Welsh Tract area of South Carolina see George L. Johnson, *The Frontier in The Colonial South: South Carolina Backcountry, 1736-1800* (Westport, Ct., 1997), 130. The Whigs, however, had an effective Quaker spy among these

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communities, Adam Reep. "Adam Reep: A Hero of the Revolution,"  
*Atlanta (Georgia) Constitution*, January 24, 1898.

<sup>72</sup> Mary E. Lazenby, *Herman Husband: A Story of a Life* (Washington, DC, 1940), 121; Leah Townsend, *South Carolina Baptists, 1670-1805* (Columbia, SC, 1935), 166-67; Seth B. and Edith Hinshaw, *Carolina Quakers: Our Heritage, Our Hope* (Greensboro, NC, 1972), 19; George W. Paschal, *History of North Carolina Baptists*, 2 vols. (Raleigh, NC, 1930-1955), 1: 392; Jones, "Herman Husband," 83-91, 94, 101-6, 110-11; Klein, "Frontier Planters," 51-67; *Gazette of The State of South Carolina* (Charleston), April 14, 1779. The history of the Bush River Meeting can be found in Willard Heiss, *Quakers in The South Carolina Backcountry* (n. p., 1969).

<sup>73</sup> Robert W. Barnwell, "Loyalism in South Carolina, 1765-1785," (Ph. D. diss., Duke University, 1941), 128, 131. Archibald Campbell remembered Boyd as bringing his Loyalists from Red Creek, South Carolina. Campbell, *Journal*, 58. A Red Branch Creek exists on the Saluda River but, in Campbell's native Gaelic, "Red Creek" would be "Raeburn," the name of a waterway in today's Laurens County, South Carolina. For the early settlers of today's Rabon Creek (also Raburns, Raeburn, Rayborn, and Reborns Creek) see the COM Index to land grants at the South Carolina Department of Archives and History, Columbia. The name first appears with John Turk's request for land in 1753. Turk, formerly of Augusta County, Virginia, had been living

there as early as 1749. No records have been found that support the claim that it received its name from an early settler named "Ray Burns." Motes and Motes, *Laurens and Newberry Counties*, 5, 233; [no title], *Names in South Carolina* 27 (Winter 1971): 8. For some of the lists of Loyalists that include men from Raeburn Creek see: "List of Prisoners, Ninety Six Jail, 1779," *South Carolina Magazine of Ancestral Research* 5 (fall 1977): 195-98; "Tories Murdered in the South Carolina Upcountry in the Revolution," *Ibid*, 9 (Summer 1981): 123-27; Peter Wilson Coldham, *American Migrations, 1765-1799* (Baltimore, Md., 2000), 655; *Gazette of The State of South Carolina*, December 24, 1779; Murtie June Clark, *Loyalists in The Southern Campaign*, 3 vols. (Baltimore, Md., 1979), 3: 412-18; Bobby G. Moss, *Loyalists at King's Mountain* (Blacksburg, SC, 1998) and *Loyalists in The Siege of Ninety Six* (Blacksburg, SC, 1999).

<sup>74</sup> Lambert, *South Carolina Loyalists*, 51, 53, 71; Barnwell, "Loyalism in South Carolina," 129; Clyde R. Ferguson, "General Andrew Pickens" (Ph. D. diss., Duke University, 1960), 18; Troxler, "The Migration of Carolina and Georgia Loyalists," 242-43; Brown, *The South Carolina Regulators*, 128-29; Revolutionary War pension claim of John Brown, SC S17848, *Revolutionary War Pension and Bounty Land Warrant Application Files, 1800-1900* (National Archives microfilm M804, roll 370); David Fanning, *The Narrative of Col. David Fanning*, ed. Lindley S. Butler

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(Davidson, NC, 1981), 4-5, 19; John Hairr, *Colonel David Fanning: The Adventures of a Carolina Loyalist* (Erwin, NC, 2000), 16, 54.

<sup>75</sup> Lambert, *South Carolina Loyalists*, 51-53, 71; "Col. David Fanning," unidentified newspaper clipping in the possession of Linda Roholt of Bellevue, Washington, D. C.; *The Annual Register or a View of the History, Politics, and Literature for the Year 1780* (London, 1780): 179-80; Barnwell, "Loyalism in South Carolina," 141-42; Palmer, *Biographical Sketches of Loyalists*, 742; deposition of Joseph Cartwright, September 1, 1779, North Carolina Papers, 1 KK 108, Lyman C. Draper Collection; Brown, *The Good Americans*, 46-47. Thomas Rogers may have meant that he was in the attack on Lindley's fort and later was also among the some twenty Loyalists captured at the battle of Kettle Creek, of which five of the South Carolinians went to the gallows. Rogers wrote that two or three of the men [eventually?] captured after the battle at Lindsey's fort were hanged. Barnwell, "Loyalism in South Carolina," 166-67. For the location of Lindley's fort see R. L. Barbour, *South Carolina's Revolutionary War Battlefields: a Tour Guide* (Gretna, La.: Pelican Publishing, 2002), 19.

<sup>76</sup> Minutes of the Cane Creek Monthly Meeting (1760-1900), 29-30, 32-33, 38-39, 47, Friends Historical Collection, Hege Library, Guilford College, Greensboro, NC; Jones, "Herman Husband," 84-88, 104-5, 107,

110, 116-18; memorial of Moses Watkins, Audit Office Papers AO 13/32/681-82, National Archives of the United Kingdom, Kew, England.

<sup>77</sup> Rose, *Washington's Spies*, 156-58.

<sup>78</sup> Davis, *Quaker Records*, 157-67; John G. Jackson, Jr., *My Search for John Stephen Jackson: His Ancestors and His Descendants* (Greenville, SC, 2006), 7-1 through 7-4.

<sup>79</sup> Davis, *Quaker Records*, 26; Cashin, *Lachlan McGillivray*, 72, 235; "George Galphin," *Jacksonville (Alabama) Republican*, June 1, 1852, p. 2, c. 3-4; Alick Cornels to Creek Headmen, June 14, 1793, in Louise F. Hays, ed., "Creek Indian Letters, Talks, and Treaties" (typescript, Atlanta: Georgia Department of Archives and History, 1939), pt. i, p. 323; Davis, "George Galphin and the Creek Congress of 1777," 14-16, 24-25. Galphin fathered at least nine children by six different women from the different races. Early Creek historian Thomas Woodward wrote of him that "of the five varieties of the human family; he raised children from three, and no doubt would have gone the whole hog, but the Malay and the Mongol were out of his reach." Thomas Woodward, *Woodward's Reminiscences of the Creek, or Muscogee Indians* (Montgomery, Al., 1859), 91-92.

<sup>80</sup> For the ambiguous views held by southern frontiersmen about the Indians see Joshua Piker, "Colonists and Creeks: Rethinking the Pre-

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Revolutionary Southern Backcountry," *Journal of Southern History* 70 (August 2004): 503-540, and for the background of the whites who traded with the Indians of the southern frontier see Amos J. Wright, *The McGillivray and McIntosh Traders on The Old Southwest Frontier, 1716-1815* (Montgomery, Al., 2001) and Theresa M. Hicks and Wes Taukchiray, *South Carolina Indians, Indian Trader, and Other Ethnic Connections Beginning in 1670* (Spartanburg, SC, 1998). Alexander McGillivray is covered in Melissa A. Stock, "Sovereign or Suzerain: Alexander McGillivray's Argument for Creek Independence after the Treaty of Paris of 1783," *Georgia Historical Quarterly* 92 (Summer 2008): 149-76.

<sup>81</sup> Stephen B. Weeks, *Southern Quakers and Slavery: A Study in Institutional History* (New York, 1896), 180-81; John B. O'Neall and John A. Chapman, *The Annals of Newberry* (Newberry, SC, 1892), 33; Franklin, "The Quaker Settlement of Wrightsborough," 23; Charles F. Irons, *The Origins of Proslavery Christianity: White and Black Evangelicals in Colonial and Antebellum Virginia* (Chapel Hill, 2008), 39-40, 68-72, 182-83. For the anti-slavery attitudes in the South before 1860 see John C. Inscoe, *Race, War, and Remembrance in the Appalachian South* (Lexington, Ky.: University Press of Kentucky, 2008), 13-64; and Richard B. Drake, "Slavery and Antislavery in Appalachia," in John C. Inscoe, ed., *Appalachians and Race: The Mountain South from Slavery to Segregation* (Lexington, Ky.: University Press of Kentucky, 2001), 16-26.

<sup>82</sup> Klein, "Frontier Planters," 67-68; Alfred W. Blumrosen, *Slave Nation: How Slavery United The Colonies and Sparked The Revolution* (Naperville, Il., 2005), 1-17, 12, 23, 142; Johnson, *The Frontier in The Colonial South*, 121. For issues of slavery see Robert Olwell, *Masters, Slaves & Subjects: The Culture of Power in The South Carolina Low Country, 1740-1790* (Ithaca, NY, 1998) and Jim Piecuch, *Three Peoples, One King: Loyalists, Indians, and Slaves in the Revolutionary South, 1775-1782* (Columbia, SC, 2008).

<sup>83</sup> Mary Louise Clifford, *From Slavery to Freetown: Black Loyalists after the American Revolution* (Jefferson, NC, 1999), 17; Davis, *Georgians in the American Revolution*, 108-11. The origins of Matthew Moore's Big Buckhead Creek Baptists and any ties that they had to Herman Husband and the Separatist Baptists of the Regulators remain undiscovered.

<sup>84</sup> Robert S. Davis, "The Other Side of the Coin: Georgia Baptists who Fought for the King," *Viewpoints in Georgia Baptist History*, 7 (1980): 47-58; Allen D. Candler, comp., *The Colonial Records of The State of Georgia*, 39 vols. (Atlanta, Ga., 1908-1941), 10: 697, 11: 85; Elizabeth E. Kilbourne, *Savannah, Georgia, Newspaper Clippings (Georgia Gazette)*, 4 vols. (Savannah, Ga., 1999), 1: 226-27, 380; Loris D. Cofer, *Queensborough: Or, The Irish Town and Its Citizens*



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(Louisville, Ga., 1977), 56. White attitudes concerning slavery find discussion in W. Robert Higgins, "The Ambivalence of Freedom: Whites, Blacks, and the Coming of the American Revolution in the South," in Higgins, ed., *The Revolutionary War in the South—Power, Conflict, and Leadership: Essays in Honor of John Richard Alden* (Durham, NC, 1979), 43-63. Biographical information on John Spurgeon appears in Coldham, *American Migrations*, 656, and Davis, *Georgians in the American Revolution*, 110-11, 117 n. 74.

<sup>85</sup> For more on this idea see Niall Ferguson, *Colossus: the Price of America's Empire* (New York, 2004) and *The War of the World: Twentieth-Century Conflict and the Descent of the West* (New York, 2006); Gordon S. Wood, *The Radicalism of the American Revolution* (New York, 1992); Fred Anderson and Andrew Cayton, *The Dominion of War: Empire and Liberty in North America, 1500-2000* (New York, 2005); and Charles S. Maier, *Among Empires: American Ascendancy and Its Predecessors* (Cambridge, Ma., 2006).

<sup>86</sup> For the Declaration of Independence as a propaganda tool see Carl L. Becker, *The Declaration of Independence: a Study in the History of Political Ideas* (New York, 1922).

<sup>87</sup> Lambert, *South Carolina Loyalists*, 48-49; Wayne E. Lee, *Crowds and Soldiers in Revolutionary North Carolina: The Culture of Violence and War* (Gainesville, Fl., 1990), 171; Calhoun, *The Loyalists in*

*Revolutionary America*, 439-46; A. Roger Ekirch, "Whig Authority and Public Order in Backcountry North Carolina," in Hoffman, *et al*, *An Uncivil War*, 99-106. Bobby G. Moss identifies many of the Loyalists at Moore's Creek Bridge in *Roster of Loyalists at The Battle of Moore's Creek Bridge* (Blacksburg, SC, 1992). Many of these Scotsmen must have been among the 1,400 men who eventually served in John Hamilton's Royal North Carolina Regiment.

<sup>88</sup> Klein, "Frontier Planters," 46; Peter N. Moore, "This World of Toil and Strife: Land, Labor, and the Making of an American Community, 1750-1805" (Ph. D. diss., University of Georgia, 2001), 59-61, 112-14, 132, 137.

<sup>89</sup> Daniel J. Levinson, "The Study of Ethnocentric Ideology," in Levinson, *et al*, *The Authoritarian Personality* (New York, 1950), 146-47, 150; Wickwire and Wickwire, *Cornwallis*, 386.

<sup>90</sup> Robert S. Davis, "The Loyalist Trials at Ninety Six in 1779," *South Carolina Historical Magazine* 80 (April 1979): 172-81; "Colonel David Fanning," unidentified newspaper clipping in the possession of Linda Roholt of Bellevue, Washington; Davis, *Georgians in the American Revolution*, 16; Motes and Motes, comps., *Laurens and Newberry Counties*, 6-7, 17-19; Revolutionary War pension claim of James Cannon, SC S 32166, *Revolutionary War Pension and Bounty Land Warrant*

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*Application Files, 1800-1900* (National Archives Microfilm M804, roll 464); Brown, *The South Carolina Regulators*, 29, 36-37. In August, 1779, nine men were sentenced to die for treason in Wilkes County, of whom seven received reprieves. The records do not indicate if these men were or were not connected with the battle of Kettle Creek. Allen D. Candler, comp., *The Revolutionary Records of The State of Georgia*, 3 vols. (Atlanta, Ga., 1908), 2: 177-79; Grace G. Davidson, comp., *Early Records of Georgia Wilkes County*, 2 vols. (Macon, Ga., 1933), 2: 2-12. For the officially sanctioned hangings of Loyalists in South Carolina see Barnwell, "Loyalism in South Carolina," 166-73.

<sup>91</sup> According to legend, Aquila Hall betrayed a fort to the Indians, resulting in the deaths of the families inside. This story may be a garbled account of the attack by the Loyalists and Cherokees upon Lindley's fort in 1775. In British East Florida, he received a commission as an ensign in the South Carolina Royalists. During the march to Kettle Creek, Hall made threats to coerce his reluctant neighbors to join Boyd's band. A Marshall Franks claimed to have captured Hall during a raid into Georgia by Col. Leroy Hammond in February or early March 1779. Deposition of Samuel Beckham, *et al*, June 1, 1812, Joseph Bevan Collection, Georgia Historical Society Library, Savannah; deposition of Joseph Cartwright, September 1, 1779, North Carolina Papers, 1 KK 108, Lyman C. Draper Collection; Clark, *Loyalists*, 3: 415; Clark, *Loyalists in the Southern Campaign*, 1: 48; McCall, *History of Georgia*, 2: 205; Revolutionary War pension

claim of Marshall Franks, SC S 10703, (National Archives microfilm M804, roll 1018). That Hall may have been hung for his part on the attack on Lindley's fort is supported by a statement by Thomas Rogers that two or three men were [eventually?] hanged for their role in that battle and by a 1769 deed that mentions John Anderson, had Aquila Hall as a witness, and James Lindley, a justice of the peace, as the notary, showing that these three men later hanged after being captured at Kettle Creek knew each other before the war. Barnwell, "Loyalism in South Carolina," 166-67; Motes and Motes, *Laurens and Newberry Counties*, 167.

<sup>92</sup> Crane Brinton, *The Anatomy of Revolution* (New York, 1965), 133-34, 161-67; Robert S. Davis, "A Georgian and a New Country: Ebenezer Platt's Imprisonment in Newgate for Treason in 'The Year of the Hangman,' 1777," *Georgia Historical Quarterly* 64 (Spring 2000): 106-15; Nancy Gentile Ford, *Issues of War and Peace* (Westport, Ct., 2002) 21.

<sup>93</sup> Klein, *Unification of a Slave State*, 73, and "Frontier Planters," 55-59; Smith, *Morningstars of Liberty*, 103-4; Barnwell, "Loyalism in South Carolina," 137; quotation from *Annual Register or a View of the History, Politics, and Literature for the Year 1779* (new edition, London, 1796), 179. Although at the time and since, the Scoffelites were said to have been named for notorious chicken bandit

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Joseph Coffel, the name may have actually referred to how the backcountry Loyalists found themselves chained together in coffles in 1775 and marched to confinement. Harvey to Baika, December 30, 1775, Orkney Island Archives.

<sup>94</sup> Johnson, *The Frontier in the Colonial South*, 115, 121; Gordon B. Smith, *History of The Georgia Militia, 1783-1861* 5 vols. (Milledgeville, Ga., 2000), 3: 84-90; Edward J. Cashin, *The King's Ranger: Thomas Brown and The American Revolution on The Southern Frontier* (Athens, Ga., 1989), 48-49, 98; Campbell, *Journal*, 48; McCall, *History of Georgia*, 2: 192, 202-3; Klein, "Frontier Planters," 60-66.

<sup>95</sup> John Shy, *A People Numerous and Armed: Reflections on the Military Struggle for American Independence* (rev. ed., Ann Arbor, Mi., 1990), 187; Charles Woodmason, *The Carolina Backcountry on The Eve of The Revolution*, ed. Richard J. Hooker (Chapel Hill, NC, 1953), 181, 207, 208, 242; Nelson, *The American Tory*, 7; Calhoun, *The Loyalists in Revolutionary America*, 453-54; Troxler, "The Migration of Carolina and Georgia Loyalists," 9; Davis, *Georgians in the American Revolution*, 113-14.

<sup>96</sup> Smith, *History of The Georgia Militia*, 4: 68 n. 5, 103; Leslie Hall, *Land & Allegiance in Revolutionary Georgia* (Athens, Ga., 2001), 153; Davis, "The Invisible Soldiers," 25-26; Campbell, *Journal*, 127, n. 183. The molested Georgians had previously taken oaths before

Captain John Hamilton, as the British representative, before escaping to join Colonel John Dooly just before the battle of Kettle Creek.

Dooly to Samuel Elbert, February 16, 1779, Miscellaneous Manuscripts Collection, Manuscripts Division, Library of Congress.

<sup>97</sup> Robert S. Davis, "The Mysteries of Tyner, Tennessee," *Chattanooga Regional Historical Journal* 9 (July 2006): 33-44; Blanco, *The American Revolution*, 127. Popular legend credited Dabney with earning his freedom as a substitute for his master at the battle of Kettle Creek.

<sup>98</sup> M. Scott Peck, *The Different Drum: Community-Making and Peace* (New York, 1987), 70-73; Brinton, *The Anatomy of Revolution*, 190-97.

<sup>99</sup> Jerome J. Nadelhaft, *The Disorders of War: The Revolution in South Carolina* (Orono, Me., 1981), 51, 55-60; Arnold Mindell, *Sitting in The Fire: Large Group Transformation Using Conflict and Diversity* (Portland, Or., 1995), 21-23, 33, 228; Levinson, "The Study of Ethnocentric Ideology," 107, 146-47, 150; Weir, "The Last of American Freeman," 148-49; Stephenson, *Patriot Battles*, 19; Klein, "Frontier Planters," 87; Lambert, *South Carolina Loyalists*, 296-98. The Richard Holmes quote comes from his 2005 BBC documentary *Rebels and Redcoats*.

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<sup>100</sup> Robert S. Davis, "A Georgia Loyalist's Perspective of the American Revolution," *Georgia Historical Quarterly* 81 (spring 1997): 119, fn. 3, 138; Babits and Howard, *Long Obstinate, and Bloody*, 62.

<sup>101</sup> Robert S. Davis, "Nathaniel Pendleton and the Attempt to Publish the First Digest of Georgia Laws," *Proceedings and Papers of the Georgia Association of Historians* 9 (1988), 155-60.

<sup>102</sup> Edmund S. Morgan, *The Genuine Article: a Historian Looks at Early America* (New York, 2004), 147-49; Tarleton Brown, *Memoirs of Tarleton Brown* (1862; rep. ed. Barnwell, SC, 1999), 9-10; David Brion Davis, "American Slavery and the American Revolution," in Ira Berlin and Ronald Hoffman, eds., *Slavery and Freedom in the Age of the American Revolution* (Charlottesville, Va., ), 270; Robert M. Weir, "The Violent Spirit': The Reestablishment of Order, and the Continuity of Leadership in Post-Revolutionary South Carolina," in Hoffman, *et al*, *The Uncivil War*, 72-91.

<sup>103</sup> Alex M. Hitz, "Georgia Bounty Land Grants," *Georgia Historical Quarterly* 38 (September 1954): 337-38, 341; Davis, *Georgians in the Revolution*, 215. Owen Fluker represents a relevant example of this type of frontiersman. He fought at Kettle Creek under Dooly, likely to protect his nearby farm. The state of Georgia took no legal action against him as a Loyalist but did allow him a land grant for peacefully remaining in Georgia during the last eleven months of the war. After his death, an informant prevented his heirs from receiving

a grant of land in Georgia's land lot lotteries based upon his claim of Revolutionary War service on the grounds of Fluker being a "Tory." Like hundreds of his neighbors, he had probably only been compelled to serve in the restored colonial militia. Bowen, *Chronicles of Wilkes County*, 19; Robert S. Davis, *The Georgia Black Book: Morbid, Macabre, and Sometimes Disgusting Records of Genealogical Value* (Greenville, SC, 1982), 42.

<sup>104</sup> Carolyn Murphree Backstrom, "Mercy Raymond Bedford of North Carolina, Patriot," *Mayflower Quarterly* 44 (August 1978): 80-82; Wallace Brown, *The King's Friends: The Composition and Motives of The American Loyalist Claimants* (Providence, RI, 1965), 103-4; Davis, *Georgians in the American Revolution*, 40; Palmer, *Biographical Sketches of Loyalists*, 57. Curiously, the lives of Loyalist Jonas Bedford, Richard Pearis, and other southern Loyalists could have been the model for the fictional Whig Benjamin Martin in *The Patriot*, a motion picture made in 2000 that ignored the conflicts between Americans in the Revolutionary War South to blame atrocities in that war solely upon the occupying British army.

<sup>105</sup> Calhoun, *The Loyalist Perception*, 195-210; Bettye J. Broyles, *History of Rhea County, Tennessee* (Dayton, Tn., 1991), 327.

<sup>106</sup> Quoted in Maurice R. Stirewalt, *North Carolina Research: Genealogy and Local History* (Raleigh, NC), 383.



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<sup>107</sup> For examples of the lives made by frontier Loyalists, see Lambert, *South Carolina Loyalists*, 71; and Joseph Moore, "The Quaker John Moore of Upton Creek, Wrightsboro Township," *Georgia Genealogical Society Quarterly* 44 (Spring 2008): 13-46. For the thesis on moderation see Robert M. Calhoon, *Political Moderation in America's First Two Centuries* (Cambridge, 2009).

<sup>108</sup> Wilbur H. Siebert, *Loyalists in East Florida, 1774 to 1785*, 2 vols. (Deland, Fl., 1929), 2: 349, and *East Florida as a Refuge of Southern Loyalists, 1774-1785* (Worcester, Ma., 1928), 10-11; Lambert, *South Carolina Loyalists*, 70-72; Klein, *Unification of a Slave State*, 95-97, 99-102; Smith, *Morningstars of Liberty*, 103-4; Cashin, *The King's Ranger*, 75; S. D. H---u to ?, January 14, 1779, in Stone, *Letters of Brunswick and Hessian Officers*, 238; Martha Condray Searcy, *The Georgia-Florida Contest in the American Revolution, 1776-1778* (Tuscaloosa, Al., 1985), 132, 248 n. 34; Barnwell, "Loyalism in South Carolina," 185-87, 321; Palmer, *Biographical Sketches of Loyalists*, 564; Clark, *Loyalists in The Southern Campaign*, 1: 48; Grimké, "Journal of the Campaign to the Southward," 65, 130, 191.

<sup>109</sup> William Millen swore that he met with a Loyalist leader, representing Archibald Campbell, named James Boyd in Wrightsborough on January 24, 1779. Zachariah Gibbes, however, would identify his leader at Kettle Creek as Colonel John Boyd. Millen or Gibbes may have been mistaken although both a John and a James Boyd lived on

Raeburn Creek. If two Boyds participated in the Kettle Creek campaign, a John Boyd who served as a colonel and a James Boyd (a father or older brother of John who was allowed to remain in South Carolina after the American Revolution?) then William Millen would have been correct in stating that he met James Boyd at Wrightsborough, where James would have been likely trying to influence old friends, and Zachariah Gibbes would also be right in stating that that the Loyalists had John Boyd as their commander.

<sup>110</sup> North Carolina historian Samuel A. Ashe wrote that Boyd came from the Lower Yadkin Valley. A deposition made by Revolutionary War veteran Samuel Beckaem in 1812 stated that Boyd came from "Yadkin N. Carolina" and Mordecai Miller in his 1832 Revolutionary War pension claim stated that Boyd and Moore came from Lincoln County, North Carolina. A Robert Boyd did live in North Carolina, in Anson County as early as 1766, and a John Boyd took up land in Rowan County by 1759. Samuel A. Ashe, *History of North Carolina* (2 vols., Greensboro, NC: 1925), 1: 598-99; Davis, *Georgia Citizens and Soldiers*, 168; deposition of Mordecai Miller, November 5, 1832, Revolutionary War pension claim of Mordecai Miller, SC S 16972, *Revolutionary War Pension and Bounty Land Warrant Application Files, 1800-1900* (National Archives Microfilm M804, roll 1729).

<sup>111</sup> *Gazette of The State of South Carolina* (Charleston), April 14, 1779; Pickens to Lee, August 28, 1811, Thomas Sumter Papers, 1VV107,

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Lyman C. Draper Collection. For the situation in New York see Schechter, *The Battle for New York*. Archibald Campbell remembered Boyd as bringing his Loyalists from Red Creek, South Carolina; no such place exists in the upcountry except, in Campbell's native Gaelic, as Raeburn Creek, the name of a waterway in today's Laurens County, South Carolina. A John Boyd appeared on a 1779 list of South Carolina Loyalist outlaws that also included John Spurgeon, the major at Kettle Creek. Boyd reportedly came from the area that became Newberry County, near Raeburn Creek. Campbell, *Journal*, 58; Coldham, *American Migrations*, 656, 689; Clark, *Loyalists*, 3: 431. Francis Pickens to J. H. Marshal, May 12, 1858, Thomas Sumter Papers, 16 VV 356, Lyman C. Draper Collection. A James Boyd settled on the South Carolina frontier by 1744 and a man by the same name left a will in 1784 wherein he bequeathed his Raeburn Creek plantation to his son Samuel; a John Boyd petitioned for land in that area in 1753. National Society of the Colonial Dames, comp., *The Register Book for The Parish Prince Frederick Winyaw* (Baltimore, 1916), 51, 95, 96, 98; Willie Pauline Young, comp., *Abstracts of Old Ninety Six* (1950; rep. ed., Greenville, SC, 1977), 33.

<sup>112</sup> Davis, *Georgians in the American Revolution*, 13-17; Davis, *Quaker Records*, 61; Palmer, *Biographical Sketches of Loyalists*, 918; David Schenck, *North Carolina 1780-81* (Raleigh, NC, 1889), 52-53; Revolutionary War pension claim of Aaron Deveny, S8321, (National Archives microfilm M804, reel 802); Memorial of John Hamilton, Audit

Office Papers A. O. 13/119/421, National Archives of the United Kingdom, Kew.

<sup>113</sup> Clark, *Loyalists*, 3: 431; *South Carolina and American General Gazette*, November 19, 1779; quotation from *Annual Register or a View of the History, Politics, and Literature for the Year 1779* (new edition, London, 1796), 179.

<sup>114</sup> Brinton, *The Anatomy of Revolution*, 157-58.

<sup>115</sup> Davis, *Georgians in the American Revolution*, 11, 13, 20, 57 n. 3; Francis Pickens to J. H. Marshal, May 12, 1858, Thomas Sumter Papers, 16 VV 356, Lyman C. Draper Collection; Motes and Motes, *Laurens and Newberry Counties*, 259; Robert S. Davis and Kenneth H. Thomas, *Kettle Creek: The Battle of the Cane Brakes* (Atlanta, 1975) 60. Moses Kirkland, formerly of Raeburn Creek, attempted a similar mission to the British headquarters in Boston in 1775 but the Whigs intercepted him at sea. Calhoun, *The Loyalists in Revolutionary America*, 456. No record appears in Archibald Campbell's accounts of his advancing Boyd any funds although passing mentions of this Loyalist emissary appear in Campbell's memoirs.

<sup>116</sup> For these accounts of life on the frontier see Charles Woodmason, *The Carolina Backcountry on the Eve of the Revolution; the Journal and other Writings of Charles Woodmason, Anglican Itinerant*, ed.

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Richard J. Hooker (Chapel Hill, NC, 1953); William Mylne, *Travels in the Colonies in 1773-1775*, edited by Ted Ruddock (Athens, Ga., 1990); and Louis Milford, *Memoir; or, A cursory glance at my different travels & my sojourn in the Creek Nation* (Chicago, 1956).

<sup>117</sup> Mary Beth Norton, "Eighteenth-Century American Women in Peace and War: The Case of the Loyalists," *William & Mary Quarterly*, 33 (July 1976): 396, 398; Cynthia A. Kierner, *Southern Women in the Revolution, 1776-1800* (Columbia, SC, 1998), xxv; Harry M. Ward, *Between the Lines: Banditti of the American Revolution* (Westport, Ct., 2002), 199. Examples of Loyalists leaving their families for the safety of the British lines can be found in Davis, *Georgians in the American Revolution*, 94, 224 and *Georgia Citizens and Soldiers*, 80, 167. For a description of the typical backcountry family, see Woodmason, *The Carolina Backcountry*, 39, and for women of the backcountry see Cynthia A. Kierner, comp., *Southern Women in Revolution, 1776-1800* (Columbia, SC, 1998).

<sup>118</sup> Blanco, *The American Revolution*, 480-81; M. Scott Peck, *The Different Drum: Community-Making and Peace* (New York, 1987), 70-73; Brinton, *The Anatomy of Revolution*, 190-97.

<sup>119</sup> Davis, *Georgians in the American Revolution*, 13-16.

<sup>120</sup> Davis, "The British Invasion of Georgia," 11; Campbell, *Journal*, 59-60; Memorial of John Hamilton, Audit Office Papers A. O.

13/119/421, National Archives of the United Kingdom, Kew. Thomas Ramsay would claim that he, George Barber, Charles Collins, and Drake Kade, while acting as scouts, were passed by Boyd's Loyalists at today's War Hill battlefield. Ramsay claimed that 700 to 800 men passed and then, to save himself, yelled out that they were about to be attacked from behind. These last some forty men then mounted their horses and rode back. This story, if true, could explain how the Loyalists became divided into two groups on opposite sides of War Hill and Kettle Creek. Revolutionary War pension claim of Thomas Ramsay, S31922, (National Archives microfilm M804, reel 1995).

<sup>121</sup> John H. Logan, *A History of the Upper Country of South Carolina from the Earliest Period to the Close of the War of Independence*, 2 vols. (Charleston, SC, 1859), 1: 152-53; John Bartram, "Diary of a Journey Through the Carolinas, Georgia, and Florida," ed. Francis Harper, in *Transactions of the American Philosophical Society* (New Series), vol. 38 (1942), pt. 1, p. 26; Ferguson, "General Andrew Pickens," 24-26; Davis, "The Loyalist Trials at Ninety Six in 1779," 174, and *Georgians in the American Revolution*, 97-118, 139, 161-62. For Ninety Six, South Carolina, see Marvin Cann, *Old Ninety Six in the South Carolina Backcountry, 1700-1781* (Troy, SC, 1996); Robert K. Dunkerly and Erik K. Williams, *Old Ninety Six: a History and Guide* (Charleston, 2006); and Robert D. Bass, *Ninety Six: The Struggle for The Backcountry* (Lexington, SC, 1978). For more on cowpens see

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Richard D. Brooks, Mark D. Groover, and Samuel C. Smith, *Living on the Edge: The Archaeology of Cattle Raisers in the South Carolina Backcountry* (Columbia, SC, 2000) and Mark D. Groover and Richard D. Brooks, "The Catherine Brown Cowpen and Thomas Howell Site: Material Characteristics of Cattle Raisers in the South Carolina Backcountry," *Southeastern Archaeology* 22 (Summer 2003): 91-110.

<sup>122</sup> Lilla M. Hawes, comp., "The Papers of James Jackson, 1781-1793," *Georgia Historical Society Collections* 11 (Savannah, 1955), 17-18; Lyman C. Draper, *King's Mountain and It's Heroes: History of the Battle of King's Mountain, October 7th, 1780, and the Event's which led to it* (Cincinnati, 1881), 252-4, 258, 272, 314; Howard C. Rice and Anne S. K. Brown, *The American Campaigns of Rochambeau's Army, 1780, 1781, 1782, 1783*, 2 vols. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1972), 1: 152. Thomas U. P. Charlton in *The Life of Major General James Jackson* (Augusta, Ga., 1809), 21, has the Wilkes Countians using their reloading specialty at the Battle of Cowpens. The rifle and the smooth bore musket/bayonet in the American Revolution find discussion in Henry Lumpkin, *From Savannah to Yorktown: The American Revolution in the South* (Columbia, SC, 1981), 135-42; J. W. Wright, "The Rifle in the American Revolution," *American Historical Review* 29 (January 1924): 293-99; and Alexander Rose, *American Rifle: a Biography* (New York: Delacorte Press, 2008), 41-68.

<sup>123</sup> Bobby Gilmer Moss, *Loyalists in the Siege of Ninety Six* (Blacksburgh, SC: Scotia-Hibernia Press, 1999), 95; Mitra Sharafi, "The Slave Ship Manuscripts of Captain Joseph B. Cook: A Narrative Reconstruction of the Brig Nancy's Voyage of 1793," *Slavery and Abolition* 24 (1) (April 2003): 99, n. 149; Harold L. Peterson, *Arms and Armor in Colonial America, 1526-1783* (Harrisburg, Pa.: Telegraph Press, 1956), 204-8. William Lake found a cannon ball, likely from a swivel gun, at the Kettle Creek battlefield. He donated it to a World War II scrape metal drive. Davis and Thomas, *Kettle Creek*, 53. For a technical description of a swivel gun see Stephanie Ambrose Tubbs and Clay Straus Jenkinson, *The Lewis and Clark Companions: An Encyclopedic Guide to the Voyage of Discovery* (New York, 2003), 287.

<sup>124</sup> Davis, *Georgians in the American Revolution*, 13-19; John Dooly to Elbert, February 16, 1779, Misc. Mss. 174, Yale University Libraries, New Haven; Pickens to Lee, August 28, 1811, Thomas Sumter Papers, 1VV107, Lyman C. Draper Collection; "Homespun Yarns," *Federal Union* (Milledgeville, Ga.), July 28, 1846. Much of this account of the battle draws the recent archaeology at the site. See from Dan Elliott, *Stirring up a Hornet's Nest: The Kettle Creek Battlefield Survey* (Savannah: Lamar Institute, 2009). For information on canebrakes see Sean M. Kelley, *Los Brazos de Dios: a Plantation Society in the Texas Borderlands* (Baton Rouge, La., 2010), 13-14. The



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effect of the rifle was partially countered by the skill of some of the era's surgeons. Captain Little survived Kettle Creek and other battles to live to see 1807. Francis Carlisle and John Harris of Pickens' command received severe wounds in the battle of Kettle Creek but would live to be old men. Harris had a bullet in his skull that passed through his eye. They, and others, owed their lives to the surgical skills of a Thomas (?) Langdon. In a war that cost the lives of twenty-five percent of its wounded, his surgery appears extraordinary although he may have tended to his patients after they had been carried back to South Carolina. A British Dr. Robert Jackson remembered in 1793 that Loyalists wounded in the battles of Carr's fort and Kettle Creek in Wilkes County in 1779 speedily healed due to lack of formal medical treatment. Davis, *Georgians in the American Revolution*, 23, n. 43; Stephenson, *Patriot Battles*, 162-64; Bobby G. Moss, *Roster of South Carolina Patriots of the American Revolution* (Baltimore, Md., 1985), 552; Robert Jackson, "Observations on the Treatment of Gun-shot Wounds," *Gentleman's Magazine* 73 (January 1793): 64.

<sup>125</sup> "Savannah, February 25," *Massachusetts Spy* (Worcester, Ma.), May 7, 1779.

<sup>126</sup> Davis, *Georgians in the American Revolution*, 20; quotation from *The Annual Register or a View of the History, Politics, and*

*Literature for the Year 1780* (London, 1780): 179-80. Evan McLaurin eventually gave up his commission as his battalion faded out of existence in 1780. He died in Charleston in July 1782 while trying to raise another Loyalist corps. The South Carolina Royalists, including the men formed from the survivors of Kettle Creek, would have numerous resurrections before ending up in Jamaica with black and white members. With Lord Montagu's unit of Americans recruited from British prison ships, became the beginnings of the First West India Regiment, a unit that would serve in campaigns in the Caribbean, Africa, and the Middle East until its final disbanding in 1962. Barnwell, "Loyalism in South Carolina," 322-25; Palmer, *Biographical Sketches of Loyalists*, 564; A. B. Ellis, *The History of the First West India Regiment* (London, 1885), 27-28, 50-51.

<sup>127</sup> Pickens to Lee, August 18, 1811, Thomas Sumter Papers, 1 VV 107-1077, Lyman C. Draper Collection.

<sup>128</sup> For another discussion of numbers, community, and loyalties see Carole W. Troxler, *Pyle's Defeat: Deception at the Racepath* (Graham, NC, 2001). John Moore would go on to lead units who served without distinction in the Loyalist defeats at Ramsour's Mill, King's Mountain, and Hammond's Store before Whigs finally captured and hanged him in 1783. Draper, *King's Mountain*, 298.

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<sup>129</sup> Morgan, *The Genuine Article*, 147-55; Tarleton Brown, *Memoirs of Tarleton Brown* (1862; rep. ed. Barnwell, SC, 1999), 9-10; ; "Portugal," *Commercial Advertiser* (New York, NY), September 5, 1829, p. 2, c. 1-2.

<sup>130</sup> Robert M. Weir, "'The Violent Spirit': The Reestablishment of Order, and the Continuity of Leadership in Post-Revolutionary South Carolina," in Hoffman, et al, *The Uncivil War*, 72-91; Davis, "A Georgia Loyalist's Perspective," 119, fn. 3, 138; Wickwire and Wickwire, *Cornwallis*, 386; Richard M. Ketchum, *Divided Loyalties: How the American Revolution came to New York* (New York: Henry Holt, 2002), viii; Lawrence H. Gipson, *American Loyalist: Jared Ingersoll* (New Haven: 1971), vii-xxvi. Summaries of traditional views of southern Loyalists appear in Draper, *King's Mountain*, 75, 238-42; and James Potter Collins, *A Revolutionary Soldier* (Clinton, La., 1859), 23.

<sup>131</sup> Brinton, *The Anatomy of Revolution*, 190-97; McCall, *The History of Georgia*, 2: 203. Henry Williams represents the broad travels of these loyalists. He survived the defeat at Moore's Creek, North Carolina, near his home to move, with his brothers, to Wilkes County, Georgia. When the British overran much of the South in 1780, he stayed in his new home and became the major in Colonel Waters' Loyalist militia regiment before Waters' defeat at Hammond's Store, South Carolina.

After the war, he too went into exile. Troxler, "The Migration of Carolina and Georgia Loyalists," 5-6, 236; return of the Fifth Georgia Militia Regiment, November 12, 1780-January 31, 1781, Audit Office 13/4/311, National Archives of Great Britain, Kew.

<sup>132</sup> Thomas Scattergood, *Journal of the Life and Religious Labors of Thomas Scattergood* (Philadelphia, 1874), 103-4; Pearl Baker, *The Story of Wrightsboro* (Thomson, Ga., 1965), chapter nine, no page.

<sup>133</sup> Colley, *Captives*, 236.

<sup>134</sup> Bellott, *William Knox*, 185-205. Robert DeMond in *The Loyalists in North Carolina During The American Revolution*, pp. 59-60, argued for identifying members of the Loyalist communities by comparing property confiscation documents to such other sources as contemporary land records. Loyalist confiscation records have appeared in print in R. J. Taylor, Jr. Foundation, *An Index to Georgia Colonial Conveyances and Confiscated Lands Records* (Atlanta, Ga., 1981) and Albert B. Pruitt, *Abstracts of Sales of Confiscated Loyalists' Land and Property in North Carolina* (n. p., 1989).

<sup>135</sup> Olwell, *Masters, Slaves, and Subjects*, 277-79; Lambert, *South Carolina Loyalists*, 259-85; Davis, *Georgians in the American Revolution*, 40; Coldham, *American Migrations*, 674, 683, 720, 751; Palmer, *Biographical Sketches of Loyalists*, 196, 312, 639, 644, 676,

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957; Blanco, *The American Revolution*, 126-28; Davis, *Georgia Citizens and Soldiers*, 32; James Jackson to ?, December 2, 1786, Telamon Cuyler Collection, Ms 1170, box 82, file 1, Hargrett Library, University of Georgia Libraries, Athens.

<sup>136</sup> John Van Houten Dippel, *Race to the Frontier: "White Flight" and Western Expansion* (New York: Algora, 2005), 39-64; Hahn, *The Roots of Southern Populism*, 108-11.

<sup>137</sup> Clifford, *From Slavery to Freetown*, 59, 192-210; Simon Schama, *Rough Crossings: Britain, the Slaves, and the American Revolution* (New York, 2006), 97, 124-25, 257-422. For former slaves in America, Nova Scotia, and Sierra Leone also see Cassandra Pybus, *Epic Journeys: Runaway Slaves of the American Revolution and Their Global Quest for Liberty* (Boston, 2006). African-American minister George Liele did escape to Jamaica, as a servant of Raeburn Creek Loyalist Moses Kirkland. While reestablishing his ministry on that island, Liele even worked for Governor Archibald Campbell, the conqueror of Georgia who had given a provincial commission to Henry Sharp, Liele's rebellious former master. Liele kept Sharp's bloody glove as a memento. Davis, *Georgians in the American Revolution*, 109-11.

<sup>138</sup> Rich, *An Atlas of the Difficult World*, Section XI, 23.

<sup>139</sup> See J. Leitch Wright, *Britain and the American Frontier, 1783-1815* (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 1975).

<sup>140</sup> For a discussion of the role of practical moderation in the South and in American history see Robert M. Calhoun, *Political Moderation in America's First Two Centuries* (New York, 2009) and for a historical overview of Britain's relationship with the United States see Kathleen Burk, *Old World, New World: the Story of Britain and America* (London: Little Brown, 2007).